

Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence: A New Theory of Urban Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1961/1965).

This publication was downloaded from

<http://www.kevinrkosar.com/Edward-C-Banfield/>

Placing this file on a website server or reprinting this publication for sale is prohibited.



Edward G. Banfield

# Political Influence

A New Theory  
Of Urban Politics

*Over Study*



A FREE PRESS PAPERBACK  
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

POLITICAL INFLUENCE

# Political Influence

BY EDWARD C. BANFIELD

*Fp*

THE FREE PRESS, *New York*  
COLLIER-MACMILLAN LIMITED, *London*

## Preface

Copyright © 1961 by The Free Press, A Corporation  
*Printed in the United States of America*

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher.

Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., Toronto, Ontario

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 60-12182

FIRST FREE PRESS PAPERBACK EDITION 1965

*Third printing December 1968*

**T**his study was financed by the Governmental Affairs Foundation with funds from the Edgar B. Stern Family Fund. The sponsors gave the author the utmost freedom in the formulation of the problem and in the design and execution of the research. Their only requirement was that it delineate political realities — “influence” was the key category — which should be taken into account by anyone seeking to bring about an improvement in the structure of government in the metropolitan area of Chicago. With a very few exceptions, proposals for metropolitan reorganization have failed to win acceptance in the United States. A better understanding of the workings of influence in the metropolitan areas, the sponsors reasoned, might lead to sounder and more feasible proposals for reform. It was not a part of the author’s task to propose any reforms, however, or even to suggest the tactics that reformers should follow in Chicago. While the author sincerely hopes that the sponsors’ purposes are served by the study, these were not the only ones he had in mind in making the study.

Peter B. Clark is the principal author of Chapter 5, “The Fort Dearborn Project.” Interviews collected by him have been used in other chapters as well, and a general debt is owed him for advice and criticism.

Dr. Luther Gulick, president of the Public Administration Institute, and Professor Norton E. Long, now of Northwestern University, initiated the study and have encouraged and stimulated it in many ways. Warm thanks are due them both.

Acknowledgement and appreciation are also due two students, Miss Mary Cahn and Robert F. Stout, who assisted in the interviewing, and several friends and colleagues who read part or all of the manuscript. Professors Gilbert Y. Steiner, of the University of Illinois, and Grant McConnell, Herbert J. Storing, and James Q. Wilson, of the University of Chicago, made many valuable suggestions. Professors Richard Meier, of the University of Michigan, and Walter Isard, of the University of Pennsylvania, commented helpfully on Chapter 11, as did Professors Jerome Rothenberg, of the University of Chicago, and Charles E. Lindblom, of Yale University, on the first draft of Chapter 12. My old friend and collaborator, Martin Meyerson, who got me interested in urban affairs in the first place, was a lively and provocative critic, and the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, of which he is Director, made its facilities available generously in the final stages of the work.

E. C. B.

## Contents

CHAPTER	PAGE
1. Introduction .....	3
I.	
2. The Branch Hospital .....	15
3. The Welfare Merger .....	57
4. The Chicago Transit Authority .....	91
5. The Fort Dearborn Project .....	126
6. The Chicago Campus .....	159
7. The Exhibition Hall .....	190
II.	
8. The Structure of Influence .....	235
9. The Process of Influence .....	263
10. The Mythology of Influence .....	286
III.	
11. Concerning Action by Influence .....	307
12. Influence and the Public Interest .....	324
Index .....	351
Map of Chicago, Illinois .....	356-357

POLITICAL INFLUENCE



# I

## Introduction

**T**his is a study of the way influence works in a large American city. Its purpose is twofold: to describe and analyze an urban political system in one of its aspects and to contribute to the theoretical understanding of influence in political settings of all kinds.

By "influence" is meant ability to get others to act, think, or feel as one intends.<sup>1</sup> A mayor who persuades voters to approve a bond issue exercises influence. A businessman whose promises of support induce a mayor to take action exercises influence. A precinct captain who controls votes by doing favors exercises influence. A department head who improves the morale of his subordinates exercises influence.

To concert activity for any purpose — to arrange a picnic, build a building, or pass an ordinance, for example — a more or less elaborate system of influence must be created: the appropriate people must be persuaded, deceived, coerced, inveigled, or otherwise induced to do what is required of them. Any co-operative activity — and so any organization, formal or informal, ephemeral or lasting — may be viewed as a system of influence.<sup>2</sup> This is as true of the co-operative activity called government as of any other.

Government, from this standpoint, consists of acts of influence, acts which proceed from many quarters (e.g., the businessman as well as the mayor) and which produce their effect in many ways

(e.g., by reasonable discussion as well as the authority of office). To study the patterns of influence by which action is concerted in public matters is to study government.

Any empirical study must reflect the criteria, implicit or explicit, by which it is decided what data are relevant and what are not. The criteria of relevance employed here — the conceptual scheme, in other words — may conveniently be summarized under four leading questions:

① Who has influence and who is subject to it? A person does not, of course, have the same influence (as he has the same muscular strength) in every encounter. To ask which of several persons has the most influence is meaningless unless it is specified, influence with whom? With the mayor? The city-planning commission? The press? Similarly, the range of matters to which influence extends must be specified. A department head has great influence with regard to the affairs of his own department, but he may have little or none with regard to that of other departments. Thus the relevant questions are: Who has influence with whom and with regard to what? And (the mirror image, so to speak, of the first question): who can be influenced by whom with regard to what?

② How does influence "work"? What is wanted is a description of the means the influencer employs (or could employ) to affect the behavior of the influencee and of how these means act upon the motivations and expectations of the influencee. From this standpoint, the following distinctions are almost inescapable: (a) influence which rests upon a sense of obligation ("authority," "respect"); (b) influence which depends upon the wish of the influencee to gratify the influencer ("friendship," "benevolence"); (c) influence which works by improving the logic or the information of the influencee ("rational persuasion"); (d) influence which works by changing the influencee's perception of the behavior alternatives open to him or his evaluation of them, and which does so otherwise than by rational persuasion (e.g., "selling," "suggestion," "fraud," "deception"), and (e) influence which works by changing the behavior alternatives objectively open to the influencee, thus either absolutely precluding him from adopting an alternative unacceptable to the influencer ("coercion") or inducing him to select as his preferred (or least objectionable)

alternative the one chosen for him by the influencer ("positive or negative inducement"). These are analytical distinctions, of course, and a concrete act of influence is almost always a mixture of these elements. (A mayor, for example, is likely to employ in a single act of influence the authority of his office, the respect he commands as a man, rational persuasion, "selling," and perhaps both rewards and punishments as well.) The mixtures into which these analytical elements are characteristically combined are therefore particularly relevant to a description of influence.

③ What are the terms upon which influence is expended? When one speaks of the influence of a person, the reference is usually not to what he is doing or has done but rather to what he could do if he tried. A governor, for example, is not without influence merely because he does not choose to exercise any. The pertinent question, usually, is not how the governor does change the situation but how he could change it. It is seldom enough, however, to know that a person could (or could not) achieve a certain result by exerting all of his influence. Usually there are circumstances that prevent him from exercising more than a part of it. A man with a very modest property may, strictly speaking, have the ability to take a luxury cruise around the world, but he is not likely to take one because he has a family to feed, clothe, and shelter. Similarly, a governor may have ample influence to secure the passage of a certain bill but may fail to exercise it because he must save his influence for other uses.

Thus there are really two separate questions: What is A's ability to achieve the intended result? And, what is his ability to achieve it without incurring disadvantages ("costs") which he regards as equal to or greater than the advantage of the result?

Ideally, one would like to have a complete schedule of the amounts of influence the actor could exercise under all possible "cost" conditions. How much of his legislative program could the governor get approved by the legislature if he were willing to accept any sacrifice whatever (e.g. even impeachment for bribing legislators)? How much could he get accepted if he were willing to make a somewhat smaller sacrifice (e.g., loss of the chance of re-election)? How much if he were to sacrifice still less (e.g.,

hard work, day and night, persuading legislators)? How much if he were willing to make no sacrifice at all?

4. *How is action concerted by influence?* A political situation may often be viewed as one in which a proposal is to be adopted or not adopted. From this standpoint, it is relevant to inquire what acts are necessary for the adoption of the proposal, on what terms the actors who have it within their ability to give or withhold these acts can be influenced to give (or withhold) them, and through what mechanisms these terms can all be arranged (or not arranged) so that the proposal will be adopted (or not adopted).

In the following chapters this conceptual scheme is employed successively at three levels of generality. At the first and lowest level are six case studies of political influence in Chicago (Chapters 2 through 7). These tell in considerable detail how influence was used in certain recent civic controversies. Each case study is intended to answer all of the leading questions listed above.

At the second level of generality are three chapters (Chapters 8 through 10) which interpret the case studies, drawing from them a set of "low level" empirical generalizations. These generalizations also answer, although less comprehensively, the leading questions listed above.

The picture that emerges from these chapters should not be taken as typical of all metropolitan political systems. New York is very different politically from Chicago, and Los Angeles is still more different; the political system of every major metropolitan area, in fact, has some striking peculiarities. Until social scientists have made more progress in the comparative study of political systems, the observations that can be made about the similarities and differences of these cities will be too impressionistic to be of much value.<sup>3</sup> One of the purposes of the present study is to help prepare the way for systematic comparative analysis.

At the third and highest level of generality are two chapters (Chapters 11 and 12) in which an effort is made to explore the logical structure of certain aspects of influence. These chapters generalize further some of the material of the earlier chapters and they restate certain empirical generalizations as analytical ones. Both of these chapters go beyond the empirical material and

present theories which apply generally to situations involving political influence.

The advantage of studying government as patterns of influence is that attention is directed beyond the legal-formal arrangements by which things are "supposed" to be done to the much more complicated ones by which they are "really" done. It may be that the mayor and the other officials are mere puppets who dance on strings pulled by private persons from behind the scenes. If this is the case, a study which limits itself to an account of the legal-formal relations of the mayor and the officials is so incomplete as to be downright untruthful.

As this suggests, the appropriateness of the category "influence" for the study of government depends in part upon how wide the discrepancy is between the way the city is "supposed" to be run and the way it "really" is run. If, indeed, nothing were ever done except upon the basis of a purely official exercise of authority, i.e., if no unofficial influence were ever brought to bear, the use of "influence" as a guiding concept would be awkward and perverse. "Official authority" would be enough. In fact, of course, some "outside" influence almost always exists; no matter how conscientious (or how jealous of his authority!) an official may be, he is not — and in a democracy nobody thinks he should be — an "unmoved mover." Yet some governments are influenced from the "outside" relatively little and then only in ways that are easy to see; "influence" is probably not a reasonable way to approach the study of governments such as these.

The current popularity in the United States of the influence approach to the study of the community is to be accounted for in part by the importance of "outside" influence in official decisions. Just how important these influences are is a matter of opinion. Some writers, impressed with inequalities of wealth and status and inferring from these corresponding inequalities of influence, have concluded that what we have been taught to call democracy is mostly sham. The formal machinery of government, they say, is really of little importance. The big decisions are made elsewhere. They are made by private persons, especially the very rich, who meet in homes and clubhouses to "set the line on policy"

and who use their corporate positions (most of them are heads of big corporations) to enforce the decisions they have secretly made. Other persons lower down on the scale of wealth and status take orders from these higher ones, and nothing is done which has not first been approved by the "top power leaders." Anyone who resists the decisions of the "power elite" is ignored or crushed, if necessary by force.

Whether the situation in any American city corresponds to this account may be doubted. Certainly the extreme version of it wildly caricatures the way things are normally done in most of our large cities. Yet the account is plausible enough to justify careful inquiry.

Most recent studies of influence are essentially opinion polls: a more or less carefully selected sample of informants is asked to rank the prominent people of a community, or of some larger public, according to relative "power" or "leadership position" (such terms are used interchangeably in the literature), and the hierarchy that results is called a "power structure." Several very serious objections may be made to this procedure. Informants are seldom clear about what is meant by such terms as "power," "leadership," and "influence." Even if they are clear about the terms, they may not know the facts: the workings of influence are hard to see and easy to imagine. Often the questions asked are so hypothetical ("Who can make others do what he wants?") as to be meaningless; "answers" are then necessarily mere rearrangements of the verbalisms in the "questions." That the informants tend to agree in the attributions they make does not prove the attributions "correct"; agreement may mean only that the informants share a common mythology. Or it may mean that the answers have been structured along the same lines by the form of the question. When an interviewer asks, "Who are the top power leaders in this community?" he suggests by his question that there are top power leaders. Probably few respondents are thoughtful enough, or cantankerous enough, to challenge the hidden premises of such questions.

The method employed in this study seeks to avoid these difficulties. The data here consist mainly of case studies of the actual workings of influence. The events recounted in the cases were all unfolding while the research was under way, and it was possible

therefore to ask questions — not hypothetical ones, but concretely pointed ones — of most of the leading actors. The answers obtained could be checked against and supplemented by documents and other "objective" evidence, including that of subsequent behavior. In the main, therefore, the reliance here is not upon "opinion" but upon ascertainable fact. That the trustees of the Michael Reese Hospital failed to get their way in the Branch Hospital Dispute and that the Sponsors of the Fort Dearborn Project failed to carry that undertaking to realization are statements of fact that cannot be questioned in the way that general attributions of influence, even when made by well-informed people, can be questioned.

Given the conceptual framework summarized above, it is necessary to observe influence "at work" rather than "in repose." Controversy seems to provide the best setting for such observation, for in controversy the contending actors not only exercise influence but do so more or less competitively. The selection of the particular controversies to be studied did not pose a problem. The six described here are virtually a 100 per cent sample of those which were of city-wide or more than city-wide importance in the two years (1957-58) field work was under way. These studies, therefore, are not simply cases in the sense of unrelated instances or examples. Read together — and, especially, in conjunction with similar material that has been published elsewhere\* — they constitute a fairly complete account of recent civic controversy in Chicago.

It must hastily be acknowledged, however, that the method employed here has its own peculiar limitations. For one thing, attention to controversy diverts attention from what is not controversial and even from what is not *actively* controversial (e.g., what is not in the headlines). That the Chicago Title and Trust Company levies a toll on every real estate transaction, that organized barbers charge the outrageous price of \$2.00 for a haircut, that newspaper delivery trucks travel 70 miles an hour on streets closed to commercial traffic — these are all evidences of influence at work. But in these matters the influence relationship, having been established some time ago and not having been called into question recently, lies outside the ken of the researcher who

associates influence with controversy. In such "steady state" situations nothing "happens," and therefore case studies cannot be written.

Some matters of importance — for example, the influence of organized labor and of gangsters — are not discussed in the present study because the six cases studied did not happen to bring them to attention. In the analytical chapters some material is introduced to supplement the case studies. This, however, does not go beyond what was essential to the interpretation of the cases. That it is possible to describe in detail the workings of influence in the recent civic controversies of Chicago without mention of organized labor or gangsters (and with mention of Negroes in only one case) suggests something about the place of these in the influence structure. Nevertheless, these are omissions, and it must be emphasized that this book is far from being a complete or systematic account of political influence in Chicago.

Such omissions would be more serious if other researchers were not supplying some of them.<sup>5</sup>

It must be acknowledged, too, that the case-study method does not entirely eliminate opinion and conjecture from the data. That someone tries to influence a politician and that the politician responds as if he were influenced (perhaps even saying in so many words that he has been influenced) does not prove that he was influenced: he may have intended all along to act as the would-be influencer wanted him to act (perhaps for reasons very different from those of the would-be influencer), and he may have found it convenient to claim that he was influenced. The only way to find out about such things is to get a perfectly honest and straightforward account of his motives from the actor who presumably was influenced. This, of course, is very seldom possible. Although, with two important exceptions (Governor Stratton, who agreed to be interviewed but never found time for it, and Wayne Johnston, the president of the Illinois Central Railroad, who lost his temper when he was shown a first draft of "The Chicago Campus"), the actors in the cases co-operated surprisingly well with the researchers' efforts to get the inside story, it would be naive to suppose that any of them told the whole truth about what "really" moved him. The chances are that most of them did

not know themselves the precise mixture of their motives. It is disappointing, certainly, to see how impressionistic and conjectural the case studies are at most crucial points. (In the Branch Hospital case, did Ryan merely respond to pressures or did he cleverly stage-manage the whole affair? In the Chicago Transit Authority case, did the Governor really try to get his legislative leaders to accept the subsidy proposal? And, for that matter, did the Mayor try as hard as he might to influence the Governor?)

But having acknowledged these limitations, it seems appropriate to say again that the merit of the case-study approach is that it keeps close to reality, especially to the objective facts of behavior that is not merely verbal.

Social science differs from most journalism and from most history in (among other things) concerning itself with what is typical rather than with what is unique. Accordingly, both the case studies and the analytical chapters, but especially the latter, focus upon what appear to be regularities in the "normal" situation and ignore, or pay little attention to, what appear to be "accidental," "peculiar," or "exceptional" circumstances. The interest here is not in individuals (e.g., Mayor Daley or Governor Stratton) but rather in roles (e.g., mayor of Chicago or governor of Illinois), and especially in what is most characteristic of roles.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, both in the case studies and in the analysis an effort is made to describe the ends which pertain to roles and the constraints which the situation places upon roles (an especially important class of constraint is, of course, behavior shaped by other, antagonistic or competitive, roles) and to show what, given these ends and these constraints, must logically be the strategy of a skillful role-player. In reality, of course, a player may be very unskillful, and even if he is skillful he may make a mistake. For purposes of analysis, however, it is useful to assume that roles will be skillfully played. The justification for this assumption is that it leads to a more fruitful analysis. But the assumption is not generally as unrealistic as may at first be thought. People are ordinarily selected for roles according to their ability to play them skillfully, and those who cannot play them skillfully ordinarily lose them. (It is safe to say that any man who remains very long

as boss of the Chicago Democratic machine is a skillful politician!) But apart from this, the role itself, if it is a well-established one, is likely to have a good deal of skill built into it: ways of doing things that have proved functional will have been institutionalized in the role so that even an inept incumbent — one who could not himself devise a rational strategy — may act "intelligently" merely by doing what he is "supposed" to do.

This interest in describing the strategy that would be followed by skillful role-players and, more generally, in describing what is normal and typical, necessarily entails a sacrifice of realism. Some readers will feel that the analytical chapters oversimplify the cases. These readers may also find that some of the case material does not altogether tally with the generalizations that are made, and they will probably wonder why no effort is made to explain and account for exceptions to the general rules.

The justification for this lack of realism is that it is the aim of science to simplify, and that what is from one standpoint simplification is necessarily oversimplification from another standpoint. For example, the generalization is made (in Chapter 9) that civic controversies in Chicago arise out of the maintenance and enhancement needs of large formal organizations. To one who wants to predict behavior, this may be "a useful simplification" because it economizes effort by directing attention to one variable instead of many. But to one who wants to "understand the situation in its complexity," the statement is a "gross oversimplification" because it leaves out of account much that common sense suggests ought to be taken into account.

## PART I

## The Branch Hospital

**W**ITH 3,400 beds, the Cook County Hospital was said to be the biggest in the world. Big as it was, it was overcrowded. In some wards beds were only a foot apart, and in others they overflowed into the corridors. The obstetrical ward, designed for 6,000 babies a year, actually had 16,000, which meant that, normally, a mother could spend only two days in the hospital.

This was the situation late in 1954 when Daniel Ryan, president of the Cook County Board, announced that the voters would soon be asked to approve a bond issue to finance an 800-bed addition to the hospital and other improvements.

Everyone agreed that the county hospital should be enlarged and improved. In the dispute that quickly arose, the issue was *where* the new facilities should be located. Ryan proposed adding to the existing hospital, which was centrally located on the West Side. This would increase the number of patients there very little, but by spreading them over a greater space it would relieve overcrowding. He recognized that the West Side hospital was not convenient to the fast-growing South Side, some parts of which were as much as two hours away. To mitigate this, he proposed building on the South Side an emergency hospital of not more than 100 beds and an outpatient clinic. Southsiders who needed something more would have to travel to the improved West Side hospital. Those who opposed this plan felt that the West Side hospital

was already too large and that all additional facilities should be built on the South Side.

From a formal standpoint, the issue was to be settled by a majority vote of the County Board. Actually it would be settled by Ryan, for Ryan controlled the Board.

Ryan, who was 62 in 1957, had been a member of the Cook County Board almost continuously for 31 years, and his acquaintance with its affairs went back even beyond that. His father, a contractor who came to this country in 1890, had been president of the Board, and it was because he had the same name as his father that he was asked to run when his father died. Since then he had had opportunities to run for Congress and for other offices, but he had never been tempted. "I like it here," he told an interviewer. "I know my way around and it suits me."

Unlike most local politicians, he did not have a business or professional practice on the side. Early in his career a money-making friend had put him onto some very good investments. For many years he had not depended upon his salary. Some said he was a very rich man, but this he denied.

He kept his friend's picture over his desk in his inner office as much, perhaps, from admiration as from gratitude. He admitted a man who, starting from nothing, had made himself a multi-millionaire. This was probably the kind of success he would have preferred for himself.

Like all members of the County Board, Ryan held office because the slatemakers of his party put him on the ticket. (Ten commissioners were elected at large from Chicago; any Democrat who was nominated was certain to be one of these. Five commissioners were elected at large from the so-called country towns—that part of the county which lay outside of Chicago; any Republican who was nominated was certain to be one of these.) It did not follow from this that he was under the party leaders' control. On the contrary, once elected he was a power in his own right, for the law gave the president of the Board the right to appoint some 11,000 employees. If the party leaders had been foolish enough to challenge him, he could have thrown them into dismay by replacing 11,000 loyal Democrats with 11,000 others.

"Nobody makes my policy except me," Ryan responded sharply when an interviewer asked him if the County Committee of the Democratic Party had offered advice with regard to the hospital issue.

So much patronage was the source of great power. This power, wisely invested, could be made to yield more power. The additional power, wisely invested, could be made to yield still more. To take a hypothetical example: by giving some of his patronage to a ward committeeman, Ryan might increase his influence among the slatemakers. By using this influence with the slatemakers he might help a would-be candidate who, when elected, would do him favors in return. Having these favors ready to command, he might use them to earn still other favors from other people. Like the fabulous trader who started with a piece of string and ended with a kingdom, the machine politician who is single-minded and astute may build an empire by trading favors.

Ryan had made himself one of the key figures of the Democratic Party in the county. As such it was simple for him to control the Democrats on the Board. Most of them were heavily indebted to him for patronage. "If you don't go along with me," he could say, "four hundred of your friends will be walking the street tomorrow morning." Even without this direct hold over them, he could influence his fellow Democrats, for any one of them who crossed him might find himself left off the ticket at the next election.

There was one Democrat on the Board who could stand up to Ryan. This was John J. Duffy. Duffy's power arose from two circumstances. He was boss of the 19th ward. He was also an extremely able, experienced, and hard-working man—the only Democrat on the Board who had the capacity to share Ryan's responsibility for running the affairs of the county. Although Ryan did not let the reins pass out of his hands, he relied heavily upon Duffy.

The Republican minority of the Board met frequently in caucus and generally agreed to act in concert. The Democrats never found a caucus necessary. When Ryan and Duffy made a decision, the rest followed along.

There was no informal consultation between Ryan and Duffy on the one side and the Republicans on the other. They talked



business only in Board meetings, all of which were open to the public. So firm was Ryan's control of the Democratic majority that he had no need to negotiate with the Republican minority.

To influence the Board, then, one would first have to influence Ryan. This would not be easy. He was rich, powerful, and unambitious enough to be independent. The hospital matter — or at any rate *inaction* on the hospital matter — was not likely to be an issue upon which an election would turn.

"If you want to understand Dan Ryan," a Board member said, "you must remember these things. He is getting old. He is not in good health. He is very rich. He likes people."

This meant that Ryan would be accommodating, especially to those who were not bad fellows. It meant also that he would not take as much trouble as a young man might to get to the bottom of an issue. He would hear all who wanted to be heard, and he would even make some effort to find the terms on which a satisfactory compromise might be reached. But he would not stay up all night fighting for a principle or trying to cajole unreasonable people to act as if they were reasonable. Instead, he would look for the course of action that promised to make the least trouble.

Civic leaders — even those who were very critical of machine politicians — believed Ryan was honest, fair, and well intentioned. "Dan is a fine fellow," a Republican of an old Chicago family told an interviewer during the hospital dispute. "He wants to do the right thing. I hate to oppose him."

The leaders of the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago had long believed that the overcrowding of the West Side hospital should be relieved by building a large general hospital on the South Side. They had made their views clear to Ryan. In proposing his plan, he was in effect rejecting theirs.

The Council was an organization of organizations. It had been formed during the First World War to co-ordinate the activities of private and public welfare agencies. By 1954 it consisted of 253 such bodies — especially public health and family welfare agencies, homes for the aged, and medical, nursing, and other professional associations. The Council co-ordinated health and welfare services, planned for unmet needs, and rendered services — particu-

larly informational ones — to its constituent agencies. When the hospital dispute arose, its budget was \$533,000. Three-fifths of this came from the Community Fund, an organization which was housed in the same building and which appointed two of the Council's 44 directors.

The directors were drawn largely from among the lay and professional leaders of the agencies constituting the Council. Administering welfare agencies had long been too technical a business for amateurs — so, at least, a good many professionals thought — but the boards of welfare agencies were nevertheless dominated by lay people, even though the money to support the agencies came mostly from public appropriations and from popular subscription. The professionals had found that they could not operate successfully without the backing of lay leaders. The Council was one of the vehicles through which co-optation of lay leaders by professionals took place. Accordingly, while almost a third of the Council's directors were professionals, the president and three vice-presidents were always lay.

It was highly desirable, of course, that the president of the Council be one who presented the kind of image that would attract support from its public. "The Council is interested in everyone's opinion," one of its officials told an interviewer. "It is nothing without acceptance by the citizens. But naturally the support of the citizens who have a particular interest in welfare matters is the most vital to us — the kind of people who make up the boards of the agencies which belong to the Council and the many others who are the civic leadership of the community."

By general consent and without the need for any formal discussion, this was taken to imply that its president (and hence the three vice-presidents also, since they were being groomed as possible successors to the president) should normally be: male (the secretary was sometimes a woman, but no woman had ever been president); if not rich, at least prosperous (most recent presidents had been millionaires); neither radical nor reactionary nor political in a partisan way (the social work movement had not been dominated by crusaders for many years, but it was still no place for the extremely tax-minded); not overtly identified with any sectarian or minority group (a clergyman could not have

