

A

TREATISE OF FREEWILL,

BY

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NOW FIRST EDITED, FROM THE ORIGINAL MS.,

AND

WITH NOTES,

BY

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LONDON:

JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND.

M.DCCC.XXXVIII.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE idea of the following treatise appears to have been suggested by the letter of Thomas Hobbes to the Marquis of Newcastle on Liberty and Necessity, first published in 1654. Independently of the direct quotations from that celebrated tract which occur in these pages, the illustrations of its author may be traced more than once in the course of Dr. Cudworth's thoughts.

There are reasons for believing that a taste for metaphysical inquiries is beginning to flourish again in this country:—It is perhaps not too much to hope that the publication of these writings of the author of *THE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM* may contribute something to the healthful tone of such inquiries; it would indeed be matter of great and lasting satisfaction to the editor, if he were able hereafter to reflect, that, in preparing these sheets for the press, he had been an instrument, however humble, of giving that to the world which should place man's responsibility in a clearer light, or disabuse his mind of a single false notion concerning the relations in which he stands to the Author of all good.

The editor begs leave to offer his grateful acknowledgments to the Trustees of the British Museum for their liberality in granting him permission to publish these MSS. That which is now presented to the reader is marked in Ayscough's Catalogue as No. 4978: for the marginal references and notes, the editor alone is responsible; if, through the kindness of those who are interested in these studies, any additional illustrations should be transmitted to him through the medium of the Publisher, such assistance will be thankfully acknowledged and made use of in the Appendix, that will be subjoined to the concluding portion of the work.

The following extract from the *Biographia Britannica*, (Kippis' ed., vol. iv., p. 549), is perhaps worth re-printing:—"The history of the late Dr. Cudworth's Posthumous Works is somewhat curious. Having been left to the care of his daughter, Lady Masham, they for a long time quietly reposed in the library at Oates, in Essex. But, about the year 1762, when the late Lord Masham married his second lady, his lordship thought proper to remove a number of volumes of ancient learning, which had been bequeathed to the family by Mr. Locke, and the manuscripts of Dr. Cudworth, to make room for books of polite amusement. For this purpose he sold either the whole, or a considerable part of them to Mr. Robert Davis, then a bookseller in Piccadilly. Mr. Davis being told, or having concluded, that the manuscripts were the productions of Mr. Locke, it became an object of consideration with him, how to convert them, as a tradesman, to the best advantage. They contained, among other things, sundry notes on Scripture. About the same time, a number of manuscript Scriptural notes by Dr. Waterland, came into the possession of the book-sellers. The business, therefore, was, by the aid of such celebrated names as Mr. Locke and Dr. Waterland, to fabricate a new Bible with annotations. At a consultation, however, it was suggested, that though these names were very important, it would be necessary, to the complete success of the design, to join with them some popular living character. Dr. Dodd was then in the height of his reputation as a preacher, and, accordingly, he was fixed upon to carry on the undertaking. This was the

origin of Dr. Dodd's Bible. Part of the materials put into his hands the Doctor made use of in the Christian Magazine. When the manuscripts were returned to Mr. Davis, he carried them down to Barnes, in Surrey, which was his country retirement, and threw them into a garret, where they lay exposed to the dangers of such a situation. About the beginning of the year 1777, a gentleman who had a veneration for the name of Mr. Locke, and was concerned to hear that any of his writings were in danger of being lost, went to Barnes, to see these manuscripts; and being positively assured by Mr. Davis, that they were the real compositions of that eminent man, he immediately purchased them for forty guineas. He was, however, soon convinced, after an examination of them, that the authority of the bookseller was fallacious. This being the case, he remonstrated against the deception; and the vender condescended to take them again, upon being paid ten guineas for his disappointment in the negotiation. In the investigation of the manuscripts, the gentleman having discovered by many incontestible proofs, that they were the writings of Dr. Cudworth, he recommended them to the curators of the British Museum, by whom they were purchased, and thus, at last, after many perils and mutilations, they are safely lodged in that noble repository."

[Chiefly extracted from a contribution by S. A. to the *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1788, p. 1186.]

OF FREEWILL.

I. WE seem clearly to be led by the *instincts of nature* to think that there is something ἐφ' ἡμῶν, *In nostra potestate, In our own power* (though dependently upon God Almighty), and that we are not altogether passive in our actings, nor determined by inevitable necessity in whatsoever we do. Because we praise and dispraise, commend and blame men for their actings, much otherwise than we do inanimate beings or brute animals. When we blame or commend a clock or automaton, we do it so as not imputing to that automaton its being the cause of its own moving well or ill, agreeably or disagreeably to the end it was designed for, this being ascribed by us only to the artificer; but when we blame a man for any wicked actions, as for taking away another man's life, either by perjury or by wilful murder; we blame him not only as doing otherwise than ought to have been done, but also than he might have done, and that it was possible for him to have avoided it, so that he was himself the cause of the evil thereof. We do not impute the evil of all men's wicked actions to God the creator and *maker* of them, after the same manner as we do the faults of a clock or watch wholly to the watchmaker. All men's words at least free God from the blame of wicked actions, pronouncing ὁ Θεὸς ἀναίτιος, God is causeless and guiltless of them, and we cast the blame of them wholly on the men themselves, as principles of action and the true causes of the moral defects of them. So also do we blame men's acting viciously and immorally in another sense than we blame a halting or a stumbling horse; or than we blame the natural and necessary infirmities of men themselves when uncontracted by vice. For in this case we do blame the infirmities as to pity the men themselves, looking upon them as unfortunate but not as faulty. But we blame men's vices, with a displeasure against the persons themselves.

The same sense of nature's instincts appears yet more plainly from men's blaming, accusing, and condemning themselves for their own actions, when done either rashly, inconsiderately, and imprudently, to their own private disadvantage, or else immorally and viciously, and against the dictate of honesty. In which latter case men have an inward sense of *guilt* (besides *shame*), remorse of conscience, with horror, confusion, and astonishment; and they *repent* of those their actions afterward with a kind of self-detestation, and sometimes not without exercising revenge upon themselves as being a piece of justice due. No man accuses or condemns himself, nor looks upon himself as guilty for having had a fever, the stone, or the gout, when uncontracted by vice; and if all human actions were necessary, men would be said no more to *repent* of them than of diseases, or that they were not born princes, or heirs to a thousand pounds a year.

Lastly, we have also a sense of retributive, punitive, vindictive justice, as not mere fancy, but a thing really existing in nature, when punishments are inflicted upon malefactors for their unjust and illegal actions past, by civil magistrates in particular commonwealths. For though it be true that these civil punishments do in part look forward to prevent the like for the future, by terrifying others from doing the same, or to hinder these malefactors themselves

from doing the like mischief again by cutting them off by death, as we kill noxious animals, wolves, and vipers, and serpents, and mad dogs, yet it is not true that this is all the meaning of them, and that they have no retrospect to the actions past; as being satisfaction to the equitable nature of rational beings, when they see wicked men who have both abused and debased themselves, and also acted injuriously to others, to have disgrace and pain for their reward.

But men's natural instincts do more strongly suggest to them a notion of vindictive justice, in the Supreme Governor of this great mundane republic, God Almighty; in inflicting punishments upon notorious wicked persons, even here in this life, though sometimes but slowly, as Plutarch has observed*. But besides this, the generality of mankind have always had a strong presage of punishments to be inflicted by the Deity after death; and the Scripture assures us that there is a solemn day of judgment appointed, in which God will conspicuously, palpably, and notoriously render to every one according to his works or actions past. And that these punishments in Hell, after death, will respect only the future, and are no otherwise designed than as iatrical and medicinal, in order to the curing or recovering of the deceased souls punished, as some have imagined, (from whence they infer that there can be no eternal punishments,) is neither agreeable to Scripture nor sound reason. But if all actions be necessary, there seems to be no more reason why there should be a day of judgment appointed to punish men for murders and adultery, injustice and intemperance, than for agues and fevers, palsies and lethargies.

Hence it is that moralists, looking upon men's free and voluntary actions as blameworthy in a peculiar sense, have called the evil of them *malum culpæ*, an evil of fault, in way of distinction from those other necessary evils which are without fault, that is of which the doer himself was not properly the cause. Concerning which Cicero thus—*Hoc tibi persuade nihil homini pertimescendum præter culpam; i. e.* that no other evil is to be feared by a man, comparatively to the evil of fault, according to that Stoical doctrine that the truest and greatest goods and evils of rational beings, consist ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς, or ἐν τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, in their own free willed actions or things in their own power.

Wherefore, according both to the genuine instincts of nature, rightly interpreted, and the tenour of the Christian religion, we are to conclude that there is something ἐφ' ἡμῖν, in our own power, and that absolute necessity does not reign over all human actions, but that there is something of contingent liberty in them. This being an article of Christ's faith, that God hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world, and render rewards and punishments to men for their actions past in this life, good and evil. Glory, honour, and power, to every man that hath done well, but tribulation and anguish to every soul of man that hath done evil. We cannot possibly maintain the justice of God in this, if all men's actions be necessary either in their own nature, or by Divine decrees and influx. That is, we cannot possibly maintain the truth of Christianity without a liberty from necessity.

* ὡς τῆς ἀδικίας τὸν μὲν καρπὸν εὐθύς ὠραῖον καὶ προὔπτον ἀποδιδούσης, τὴν δὲ τιμωρίαν ὀψὲ καὶ πολὺ τῆς ἀπολαυστεροῦσαν.—*De his qui sero a numine puniuntur*, ii. P. 549, ed. Francof.

II. Notwithstanding which, there have not wanted some in all ages who have contended that there is no such thing as *liberum arbitrium*, nothing in our own power, no contingent liberty in human actions, but whatsoever is done by men was absolutely and unavoidably necessary.

And this upon two different grounds, first, because according to some, this contingent liberty is *πρᾶγμα ἀνύπαρκτον* or *ἀνυπόστατον*, a thing both unintelligible and impossible to exist in nature. Secondly, because though there be such a thing possible, and actually existing, yet is the exercise thereof peculiar only to God Almighty—so that he is the only self-determining Being, and the actions of all creatures were by his decrees from all eternity made necessary.

The reasons alleged why there should be no such thing in nature existing anywhere, as a contingent liberty or freewill, are chiefly such as these—First, because nothing can move itself, but *quicquid movetur movetur ab alio*; therefore whatsoever is moved is moved by something else which moveth necessarily. Secondly, because though it should be granted that there is something self-active, or moving from itself, yet nothing can change itself, or act upon itself, or determine its own action. Since the same thing cannot be both agent and patient at once.

Thirdly, because *οὐδὲν ἀνάιτιον*, nothing can come to pass without a cause; or whatsoever is done or produced had a sufficient cause antecedent; and, as Hobbes adds, *every sufficient cause is a necessary cause**. Fourthly, because all volition is determined by the reason of good, or the appearance of the greater good; now the appearances and reasons of good are in the understanding, and therefore not arbitrary but necessary, wherefore all volitions must be necessary. Fifthly, because that which is indifferent in itself can never to eternity determine itself, but will stand indifferent for ever, without motion, volition, or action, either way. Lastly, Hobbes sophistically argues the necessity of every disjunctive proposition.

From these and such like grounds have many of the ancients concluded that there is a chain of causes from eternity to eternity, every link whereof is necessarily connected both with that which went before, and that which follows after, according to that in Ennius:

*Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus,
Cæsa cecidisset abiogna ad terram Trabes:*

(to which Cicero adds, *Licuit vel altius; utinam ne in Pelio nata ulla unquam esset arbor; etiam supra, utinam ne esset mons ullus Pelius, similiterque superiora repetentem regredi in infinitum licet*),

Neve inde navis inchoandæ exordium cœpisset.

(*Quorsum hæc præterita? quia sequitur illud.*)

*Nam nunquam Hera errans mea domo efferret pedem
Medea animo œgro, amore sævo †.*

* Hobbes' Works, fol. ed. p. 484.

† Cic. de Fato, § 15.

Though this, as the same Cicero observeth, is only the chain or series of causes *sine quâ non*. For though there were never so many ships ready at hand in Medea's time, yet was there therefore no necessity that she should commit herself to sea, or be transported in any one of them. But Mr. Hobbes carries the business much further, when he dogmatizes in this manner* (p. 283). *That there is no one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in rerum naturâ*, which he saith truly is a great paradox, and which depends upon many antecedent speculations. So that according to him every action doth not only depend upon one single † chain, but is implexed and entangled with infinite chains.

But the reasons assigned why though there be such a thing as contingent liberty in nature, yet the exercise thereof must needs be peculiar to the Deity, are commonly such as these:—First, because to suppose any creature determine itself, is to make it independent upon its Creator, which is contradictious to the idea of GOD, from whence it will follow that GOD must be the sole determiner of all actions in the universe, and indeed properly the only actor. Secondly, because if there be contingent liberty in any creaturely agents, there could be no Divine prescience of future events. Thirdly, nevertheless, if it should be supposed that there is a prescience notwithstanding contingency of men's wills, yet this prescience itself will consequently infer necessity, because if there be any liberty of will as to moral things, this will be a ground of pelagianism, the necessity of Divine grace being taken away by this so much cried up *αὐτεξούσιον*, self-power, or freewill. Lastly, it seems absurd and unjust too, that men should be damned to all eternity for a contingent turn of their own will. (This takes away the reason of it, men may as well be damned for what they were necessitated to by Divine decrees).

III. If there were nothing *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, in our own power, no *αὐτεξούσιον*, or *sui potestas*, no self power, no contingent liberty of acting, but everything whatsoever acted necessarily. Then upon supposition that GOD Almighty should, after the conflagration of this earth, put the whole frame of this world again exactly in the very same posture that it was in at the beginning of this mundane revolution; and make another Adam and another Eve perfectly like the former, without the least difference either of body or mind, and they propagating or multiplying in successive generations, it should continue or run out such another period of time as this world hath lasted before, seven thousand years or more, then would everything, every motion and action in it be the very same that had been in the former periodic revolution without the least difference or variation. Another such like Cain and Abel, another Enoch, and another Noah; another Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, another Moses, another Pythagoras, another Socrates, another Jesus Christ, another Pontius Pilate, another Caiaphas, another everything, and another every person, exactly the same, wearing all the same clothes, dwelling all in the same or like houses, sitting upon the same stools, making all the same motions, writing all the same books, speaking all the same words, and doing all the same actions over again.

* "There is hardly any one action," &c. p. 481, fol. ed.

† See Hobbes' Works, p. 473, fol. ed.

This was the doctrine of the Stoics, that there had been and should be infinite such worlds or mundane periods, and circuits from eternity to eternity, exactly alike to one another. They supposing God Almighty himself to be a necessary agent too, and, therefore, that after the several conflagrations, he must needs put things in the very same posture he had before. And then all acting necessarily, there must be all along the same or like men, doing all the same things exactly.

Celsus, who for the most part personates a Platonist having vented this Stoical dogma; the learned Origen animadverts upon him after this manner, Lib. 4, p. 208*. I know not why Celsus, writing against us Christians, should think it necessary to assert this Stoical dogma, that has not so much as a seeming or probable demonstration. That from the beginning to the end, or rather without beginning or end, there should be always the same periods or circuits of mortal things; and that of necessity in certain appointed revolutions, all things that have been, are, and shall be, should be the very same again repeatedly. From whence it will follow, that of necessity Socrates shall always be about to philosophize, and to be accused for holding new gods and corrupting of the youth; and Anytus and Melitus be always about to bear witness against him, and the senate of Areopagus about to condemn him to drink poison. And after the same manner (saith this same Origen) will it be necessary that, according to appointed revolutions, Phalaris should always be about to tyrannize, and the Pheræan Alexander to act the same cruelties, and men condemned to Phalaris' bull, always about to roar. Likewise, according to this hypothesis of Celsus, (that this period of mortal things, from the beginning to the end, shall be repeated the same over again infinitely, and that always the same things of necessity will be past and present and to come without end,) Moses should always, in every revolution, lead the children of Israel out of Egypt, through the Red Sea; and Jesus being born again and again, should do the same thing which he had, not once, but infinite times, done before; and all the same Christians, also, should be in appointed times infinitely; and Celsus should write this very same book against Christians, which he had written ten thousand times before. Which, if it be admitted, I know not how any liberty of will can be defended, or how there should be any place left for praise or dispraise. Now Celsus asserteth such periodical revolutions of mortal things only, wherein of necessity the same that have been, are, and shall be, in this world, should have been heretofore, and shall be again, infinitely. But the Stoics generally maintain such periodical revolutions of immortal things too, or, at least, of those which they account gods, for after the universal conflagration which hath been infinitely, and shall be again infinitely, all things without exception, according to them, run round in the same order, from the beginning to the end: all the same gods, as well as the same men, doing the same things. Nevertheless, to lessen the absurdity hereof, these Stoics, indeed, pretend that they shall not be all numerically the same, but ἀπαράλλακτους, exactly alike in everything. So that not the same numerical Socrates shall be again but one in all things exactly alike to Socrates, who shall marry one in all things exactly alike to Xantippe, and shall be accused by two persons, in all things alike to Anytus and Melitus. But

* The reference is to Spencer's ed., 4to., Cambr. 1677. Par. ed., fol., 1733. i. p. 554, §. 67.

I understand not this (saith Origen), how since the world is always numerically the same, and not another exactly alike to another; the things in it should not be numerically the same too, and not exactly alike only.

But the case will be the same, should we suppose two numerically distinct worlds, made by God Almighty, at the same or contemporary time, exactly alike to one another, two Adams and two Eves indistinguishably the same, both in soul and body, multiplying themselves by propagation for several thousands of years. If there was no such thing as contingent liberty in nature, they must needs all along, at the same time, make the same motions, speak the same words, write the same books, all as exactly alike to one another as the motions of the image in the glass are to the body without it.

Now if we cannot think this to be possible, but that, two such worlds being made in all things perfectly alike, and the first parents, men and women, in them perfectly alike too; yet, in process of time, there would grow a great dissimilitude and diversity between them; but though this diversity were never so little, yet must it needs be granted that there is a contingent liberty, and that men have something in their own power, add something of their own, so that they can change themselves and determine themselves, and all things are not linked and tied in a fatal adamant chain of causes.

IV. Now that this is not true, *quod cuncta necesse intestinum habeant* *, or that nothing *in rerum naturâ* can possibly act otherwise than it suffers or is acted upon; but that, on the contrary, there is some contingent liberty in nature, and that men, and other rational creatures, can add or cast in something of their own to turn the scales when even, may, I think, sufficiently appear from hence. Because it cannot be denied but that there are, and may be, many cases in which several objects propounded to our choice at the same time, are so equal, or exactly alike, as that there cannot possibly be any reason or motive in the understanding necessarily to determine the choice to one of them rather than to another of them. As for example, suppose one man should offer to another, out of twenty guinea pieces of gold, or golden balls, or silver globulites, so exactly alike in bigness, figure, colour, and weight, as that he could discern no manner of difference between them, to make his choice of one and no more; add, also, that these guineas or golden balls may be so placed circularly as to be equidistant from the chooser's hand. Now it cannot be doubted but that, in this case, any man would certainly choose one, and not stand in suspense or demur because he could not tell which to prefer or choose before another. But if being necessitated by no motive or reason antecedent to choose this rather than that, he must determine himself contingently, or fortuitously, or causelessly, it being all one to him which he took, nor could there be any knowledge *ex causis* beforehand which of these twenty would certainly be taken. But if you will say there was some hidden, necessarily determining in this case, then if the trial should be made an hundred times over and over again, or by a hundred several persons, there is no reason why we must not allow that all of them must needs take the same guinea every time,

* Luc. Rer. Nat. ii. 290.

that is either the first, or second, or third, &c., of them, as they lie in order from the right or left hand.

From hence, alone, it appears that rational beings, or human souls, can extend themselves further than necessary natures, or can act further than they suffer, that they can actively change themselves and determine themselves contingently or fortuitously, when they are not necessarily determined by causes antecedent. Here is, therefore, a great difference between corporeal and incorporeal things; bodies that cannot move themselves, can never act further than they suffer, and, therefore, if causes of motions or impulsions made upon them be of equal force or strength, they cannot move at all, neither one way nor the other, If two equal scales in a balance have equal weights put into them, they will rest to eternity, and neither of them be able to move up or down. But rational beings and human souls standing in equipoise as to motive reasons, and having the scales equiponderant, from the weight of the objects themselves without them, will not perpetually of necessity always thus hang in suspense, but may themselves add or cast in some grains into one scale rather than the other, to make that preponderant, so that the determination here will be contingent or loose, and not necessarily linked with what went before. Here, therefore, is a sufficient cause which is not necessary, here is something changing itself, or acting upon itself, a thing which, though indifferent as to reason, yet can determine itself and take away that passive indifference.

But it cannot be denied by any theist, but that this liberty, at least, must be acknowledged to belong to God Almighty. There being many things in the frame and constitution of the world for which no reason could possibly be given, why they should be of necessity so as they are and not otherwise, and, therefore, must be determined by his arbitrary will and pleasure. As for example, the world being supposed not to be infinite, there could not be any necessity in the thing itself, why it should be just so big as it is, and not an inch nor an hairbreadth bigger or lesser. There could be no necessity why the number of stars should be even or odd, whereas one of them it must needs be, and is so as it seemeth good to him to appoint. So likewise Christianity assures us that God hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world; of which it is said, Mark xiii. 32, *But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.* In which words, it is implied that this is a thing determined by the arbitrary goodwill and pleasure of God the Father. There being no necessity in the nature of the thing itself, why it should be cast at such a precise time, and not an hour nor a moment sooner or later. Nay, it is commonly conceived that this whole created world, with all things in it, having no necessary existence, but precarious, both might not have been, and again is destroyable, was made by the arbitrary will and pleasure of God, according to that, Rev. iv. 11, *Thou Lord hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.* The creation being not a natural and necessary emanation, as the word and the Son is from the Father, but a free and self-determined emanation, it being, as it were, but the *λογὸς προφορικὸς* of God Almighty. *He spake the word, and they were made.*

But this arbitrary and contingent liberty of the Deity is carried on much too far by those who extend it to the necessitating of all creaturely actions and volitions by a divine predetermination of everything, with a consequent irresistible influence, and to the reprobating of far the greater part of mankind, by absolute decrees from eternity, and without any respect to their own actions, also, the future execution thereof, by damning of them for what they were necessitated unavoidably to do by God Almighty himself.

It is, indeed, an absurd saying of some that *Deus tenetur ad optimum*, God is bound to do the best; for God hath no law but the perfection of his own nature; nevertheless, it may be well concluded, that God can act nothing contrary to the same law of his own perfections, that is, can do nothing either foolishly or unjustly. And it may be piously believed, that when he did create the world, he made the whole after the best manner that (all things considered) it could have been made in. And, consequently, that as he cannot be liable to any blame for making the whole worse than it might have been; so neither is he to such praise and commendation, as men are, for doing better when he might have done worse.

V. But this contingent liberty of self-determination, which we have hitherto spoken of, (called by some of the Greek philosophers epeleustick liberty), when there is a perfect equality in objects and a mere fortuitous self-determination, is not that ἀὐτεξούσιον, that *liberum arbitrium*, which is the foundation of praise or dispraise, commendation or blame. For when two objects, perfectly equal and exactly alike, are propounded to a man's choice, as two eggs, or two guineas, or two golden balls, of equal bigness, and weight, and value, he cannot be justly blamed by any other or himself, for choosing one of them rather than another.

And the case must needs be the same in all other objects of choice, that have a perfect equality of good in them, or are means equally tending and conducing to the same end. There can be no just blame or dispraise, but only where the objects, being in themselves really unequal, the one better, the other worse, a man refuseth the better and chooseth the worse. As in the difference between the dictate of honesty or conscience, and the suggestion of the lower appetites, inclining either to sensual pleasure or private utility; he that resisting these lower and worsen inclinations, firmly adhereth to the better principle or dictate of honesty and virtue, hath in all ages and places in the world been accounted ἐπαινετὸς, praiseworthy, as being κρείττων ἐαυτῷ, superior to himself, or a self-conqueror. But he that yieldeth up himself as vanquished or succumbeth under the lower affections, called the law of the members, in opposition to that superior dictate of honesty, or law of the mind, is accounted blameworthy as being ἡσσων ἐαυτῷ, inferior to himself, or conquered by his worsen part. Now that there is such an ἀὐτεξούσιον as this too, such a liberty or will (where there is an inequality in the objects) of determining oneself better or worse, and so of deserving commendation or blame (though it be not rightly taken by some for an absolute perfection as will be showed elsewhere,) is undeniably evident, both from the common notions of mankind, and from the sense of conscience in all men, accusing or excusing them.

Nevertheless, it must be granted that there is no small difficulty in the explaining of this phænomenon rightly, so as clearly to make out and vindicate the same from all exceptions

made against it, especially since the vulgar psychology, or the now generally received way of philosophizing concerning the soul, doth either quite baffle and betray this liberty of will, or else render it absurd, ridiculous, or monstrous.

For the vulgarly received psychology runs thus, that in the rational soul there are two faculties, understanding and will, which understanding hath nothing of will in it, and will nothing of understanding in it. And to these two faculties are attributed the actions of intellection and volition; the understanding, say they, understandeth, and the will willeth. But then follows a *bivium*, wherein these philosophers are divided: for, first, many of them suppose this understanding to be the beginner and first mover of all actions. For this reason, because *Ignoti nulla cupido*, there can be no desire nor no will of that which is unknown. And, secondly, they conclude that the understanding acteth necessarily upon its several objects, without anything of will to determine either its exercise or specification of them, (which necessity some call a train of thoughts); because the will being blind, therefore cannot determine the understanding, either to exercise or specification of objects. Thirdly, that the understanding judgeth necessarily of all things, not only as to the truth or falsehood of speculative things, but also as to eligibility of practicals, what is to be done or not done. Lastly, that the blind faculty of will always necessarily follows the last practical judgment of the necessary understanding.

But others there are, who, in order to the salving of this phænomenon of liberty of will, think it necessary to suppose, that first of all, the will, though blind, yet determines the understanding both to exercise, and specification of object. And though the understanding, being necessary in its judgments, doth only propound to the blind will what he thinks ought to be done, or his last practical judgment in the case, and no more, only to allure and invite the will thereunto; but that this sovereign queen, or empress of the soul, the blind will, still remaineth as free, and indifferent to do or not to do this or that, as if the understanding had given no judgment at all in the case, and doth at last fortuitously determine itself without respect to the same either way. Which is the meaning of that definition of liberty of will commonly given, that *Voluntas, positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, potest agere, vel non agere*, that the will after all things put, the last dictate or judgment of the understanding itself therein included, is yet free and absolutely indifferent, both as to exercise and to specification, and doth determine itself to do or not, to this or that, fortuitously. There being no other way, as these men conceive, to save the liberty of the will but this only.

VI. But, I say, if this psychology be true, then either can there be no liberty at all, no freedom from necessity, or else no other than such as is absurd and ridiculous or monstrous. For, first, if the blind will do alway necessarily follow a necessary dictate of the understanding antecedent, then must all volitions and actions needs be necessary. That pretence which some here make to save liberty of will, notwithstanding it, from *the amplitude of the understanding*, as having a larger scope and prospect before it; these fancies and *hormæ*, each whereof is determined to one, signifying nothing at all, so long as the understanding in its approbation; and judgments concerning the difference of those objects, acts altogether

necessarily. But whereas some others of those philosophers, who contend that the will must, therefore, of necessity follow the last dictate or practical judgment of the necessary understanding, because it is in itself a blind faculty, do nevertheless, in order to maintain liberty, assert that this blind faculty of will doth first of all move and determine the understanding, both as to its exercise and objects. This is a manifest contradiction in itself. Besides, they are here forced to run round in an endless circle. They maintaining that the will can will nothing, but as represented to it first by the understanding, (since otherwise it must will it know not what), and again that the understanding cannot act about this or that but as it is moved and determined thereunto by the will, so that there must be both an action of the understanding going before every act of the will, and also an act of the will going before every act of the understanding, which is further contradictory and impossible.

But if the blind will does not only at first fortuitously determine the understanding both to exercise and object, but also after all is done remains indifferent to follow the last dictate of it or not, and doth fortuitously determine itself either in compliance with the same or otherwise, then will liberty of will be mere irrationality, and madness itself acting or determining all human actions. Nor is this all, but that which willeth in every man will perpetually will not only it knows not why, but also it knows not what. Then is all consideration and deliberation of the mind, all counsel and advice from others, all exhortation and persuasion, nay the faculty of reason and understanding itself, in a man, altogether useless, and to no purpose at all. Then can there be no habits either of virtue or vice, that fluttering uncertainty and fortuitous indifference, which is supposed to be essential to this blind will, being utterly incapable of either. Nor, after all, could this hypothesis salve the phænomena of commendation and blame, reward and punishment, praise and dispraise; for no praise, commendation, or blame, could belong to men for their freewilled actions neither. Since when they did well they acted but fortuitously and temerarily and by chance, and when they did ill their wills did but *uti jure suo*, use their own natural right and essential privilege, or property of acting *όπότερον έτυγχάνει*, as it happeneth, or any way, without reason.

Lastly, as for this scholastic definition of freewill, viz. that it is, after all things put besides the volition itself, even the last practical judgment in the soul too, an indifferency of not doing or of doing this or that. This is an upstart thing, which the ancient peripatetics, as Alexander and others, were unacquainted with, their account thereof being this, that *αύτοίς περιεστώσι*, the same things being circumstant, the same impressions being made upon men from without, all that they are passive to being the same, yet they may, notwithstanding, act differently. The last practical judgment also, as according to these, being that which as men are not merely passive to, so is it really the same thing with the *βούλησις*, the will, or volition.

VII. But this scholastic philosophy is manifestly absurd, and mere scholastic jargon; for to attribute the act of intellection and perception to the faculty of understanding, and acts of volition to the faculty of will, or to say that it is the understanding that understandeth, and

the will that willeth. This is all one as if one should say that the faculty of walking walketh, and the faculty of speaking speaketh, or that the musical faculty playeth a lesson upon the lute, or sings this or that tune.

Moreover, since it is generally agreed upon by all philosophers, that *actiones sunt suppositorum*, whatsoever acts is a subsistent thing. Therefore by this kind of language are these two faculties of understanding and will made to be two *supposita*, two subsistent things, two agents, and two persons, in the soul. Agreeable to which are these forms of speech commonly used by scholastics, that the understanding, propounds to the will, represents to the will, allures and invites the will, and the will either follows the understanding, or else refuses to comply with its dictates, exercising its own liberty. Whence is that inextricable confusion and unintelligible nonsense, of the will's both first moving the understanding, and also the understanding first moving will, and this in an infinite and endless circuit. So that this faculty of will must needs be supposed to move understandingly, or knowingly of what it doth, and the faculty of understanding to move willingly, or not without will; whereas to intellect as such, or as a faculty, belongs nothing but mere intellection or perception, without anything of will; and to will as such, or a faculty, nothing but mere volition, without anything of intellection. But all this while it is really the man or the soul that understands, and the man or the soul that wills, as it is the man that walks, and the man that speaks or talks, and the musician that plays a lesson on the lute. So that it is one and the same subsistent thing, one and the same soul that both understandeth and willeth, and the same agent only that acteth diversely. And thus may it well be conceived that one and the same reasonable soul in us may both will understandingly or knowingly of what it wills; and understand or think of this or that object willingly.

It is not denied but that the rational soul is *πολυδύναμος*, hath many powers or faculties in it; that is, that it can and doth display itself in several kind of energies as the same air or breath in an organ, passing through several pipes, makes several notes. But there is a certain order or method that may be conceived wherein the soul puts itself forth in these its several operations and affections, of which I shall proceed to treat in the next place.

VIII. It is a very material question which Aristotle starteth, *τὶ τὸ πρῶτως κινούν*; What is that that first moveth in the soul and setteth all the other wheels on work? that is, What is that vital power and energy which the soul first displayeth itself in, and which in order of nature precedes all its other powers, it implying them, or setting them on work? First, therefore, I say the outward observations of corporeal sense are not the only beginning and first movers or causes of all cogitations in us, as the Epicureans, Hobbians, and Atheists suppose. Who, indeed, make all cogitation to be nothing but local motions in the brain, these being only occasionally intercurrent, raising a variety of cogitations. But there is a thread of life always spinning out, and a living spring or fountain of cogitation in the soul itself. Now divers of the scholastics, as we said before, tell us that it is no other than an indifferent or blind will which first moveth the understanding and causeth deliberation, and yet after this, itself blindly chooseth and determineth all human actions. Whereas, if the first mover be

perfectly blind, then must it move to it knows not what, and it knows not why. Moreover it is not conceivable that mere indetermination and indifferency should be the first mover of all actions; besides which, necessary nature must be the beginner and spring of all action; whereas, if there were any such faculty of the soul as a blind will (which is impossible) knowledge must of necessity go before it, to represent things to it, and to hold a torch to light it and show it its way, and this must come after it, it must follow it as its guide; therefore knowledge and understanding, counsel and reason, and deliberation, seem to bid the fairest for the first mover in the soul, and that which leads the vanguard. Nevertheless it is certain that neither the speculative nor deliberative understanding doth alway act in us necessarily of itself and uninterruptedly, but we are sensible that our minds are employed and set at work by something else, that we apply them both in contemplation and deliberation to this or that object, and continue or call them off at pleasure, as much as we open and shut our eyes, and by moving our eyes determine our sight to this or that object of sight. Were our souls in a constant gaze or study, always spinning out a necessary thread or series of uninterrupted concatenate thoughts; then could we never have any presence of mind, no attention to passing occasional occurrences, always thinking of something else, or having our wits running out a wool-gathering, and so be totally inapt for action; or, could we do nothing at all, but after studied deliberation, then should we be often in a puzzle, at a stand, demur, and fumble a long time before we could act or will any thing. Aristotle himself determines that βουλή, counsel, cannot be the first moving principle in the soul, because then we must *consider*, to *consider*, to *consider* infinitely. Again, the principle of all actions, and therefore intellection itself is ends and good; every thing acting for the sake of some end and good. And concerning ends, the same Aristotle hath rightly observed, that they are οὐκ ἀυθαίρετα ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ, that they are not chosen, studied out, or devised by us, but exist in nature, and preventively obtrude themselves upon us.

Wherefore, we conclude that the τὸ πρῶτως κινουόν, that which first moveth in us, and is the spring and principle of all deliberative action, can be no other than a constant, restless, uninterrupted desire, or love of good as such, and happiness. This is an ever bubbling fountain in the centre of the soul, an elater or spring of motion, both a *primum* and *perpetuum mobile* in us, the first wheel that sets all the other wheels in motion, and an everlasting and incessant mover. God an absolutely perfect being is not this love of indigent desire, but a love of overflowing fulness and redundancy, communicating itself. But imperfect beings, as human souls, especially lapsed, by reason of the *penia* which is in them, are in continual inquest, restless desire, and search, always pursuing a scent of good before them and hunting after it. There are several things which have a face and mien, or alluring show, and promising aspect of good to us. As pleasure, joy, and ease, in opposition to pain, and sorrow, and disquiet, and labour, and turmoil. Abundance, plenty, and sufficiency of all things, in opposition to poverty, straitness, scantiness, and penury. Power, not only as it can remove want, and command plenty, and supply pleasures, but also in the sense of the thing itself. Honour, worship, and veneration, in opposition to the evils of disgrace, contempt, and scorn. Praise, commendation, and applause, in opposition to the censure of others, ignominy, and infamy.

Clarity, and celebrity, in opposition to private obscurity, and living in corners. Precellency over others, superiority, victory, and success, in opposition to being worsted or foiled, left behind, outdone, and disappointed. Security, in opposition to anxiety, and fear of losing the prize. Pulchritude, in opposition to ugliness, and deformity. Liberty, in opposition to restraint, bondage, servility, to be subject to commands and prohibitions. Knowledge, and truth, in opposition to the evils of ignorance, folly, and error, since no man would willingly be foolish, no man would err or be mistaken.

But above all these, and such like things, the soul of man hath in it *μάντευμα τι*, a certain vaticination, presage, scent, and odor of one *summum bonum*, one supreme highest good transcending all others, without which they will be all ineffectual as to complete happiness, and signify nothing, a certain philosophers' stone that can turn all into gold.

Now this love and desire of good, as good, in general, and of happiness, traversing the soul continually, and actuating and provoking it continually, is not a mere passion or *horme*, but a settled resolved principle, and the very source, and fountain, and centre of life. It is necessary nature, in us which is immutable, and always continues the same, in equal quantity. As Cartesius supposes the same quantity of motion to be perpetually conserved in the universe, but not alike in all the same bodies, but transferred, and passing from one to other; so, more or less, here and there, is there the same stock of love and desire of good always alive, working in the soul by necessity of nature, and agitating it, though by men's will and choice, it may be diversely dispensed out, and placed upon different objects, more and less.

But there are many other powers and energies of the soul, that are necessary and natural in us too, besides that lowest of the plastic life, subject to no command of the will. Its vital sympathy with the body displaying itself in the perceptions of the outward sense and of bodily pleasure and pain, the sentiments whereof the soul, as willing, hath no *imperium* over, though it have a despotic and undisputed power locomotive in the members of the body. Then fancy or imagination, sudden passions and *hormæ*, and commotions called concupiscible and irascible, whose first assaults prevent our will, intended by nature as spurs to action, and the quickeners of life, which else without them would grow dull and languish, and sometimes, as it were, fall asleep; these are natural too, come upon us unawares, invade us, and surprise us with their sudden force, and we have no absolute, despotic, easy, undisputed power over them; notwithstanding which the hegemonic of the soul may, by conatives and endeavours, acquire more and more power over them. Above all these is the dictate of honesty, commonly called the dictate of conscience, which often majestically controls them, and clashes with the former; this is necessary nature too, being here the hegemonic, sometimes joining its assistance to the better one, and sometimes taking part with the worser against it. Lastly, the understanding, both speculative understanding, or the soul, as considering about the truth and falsehood of things, and the practical, considering their good and evil, or what is to be done and not done; both of them inferring consequences from premises in way of discursive reason. The perceptions of which, are all natural and necessary, subject to no command of will, though both the exercise, and their specification of objects, be determinable by ourselves.

IX. The next grand inquiry is, what is ἡγεμονικὸν, the ruling, governing, commanding, determining principle in us. For here, or nowhere else, is to be found the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν and the τὸ αὐτεξούσιον *sui potestas*, self-power, or such a liberty of will as whereby men deserve praise or dispraise, commendation or blame. This hegemonic of the soul is a thing that was much taken notice of by the Greek philosophers, after Aristotle, and to this is ascribed by them the original of those moral evils that deserve blame and punishment. Thus the learned Origen, p. 207 *: τὸ γὰρ ἐκάστου ἡγεμονικὸν, αἴτιον τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἐν αὐτῷ κακίας ἐστὶν ἥτις ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἄλλο οὐδὲν, ὡς πρὸς ἀκριβῆ λόγον καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ κακὸν ἀλλ' οἶδα τὸν λόγον δεόμενον πολλῆς ἐξεργασίας καὶ κατασκευῆς, where the τὸ ἐκάστου ἡγεμονικὸν is rendered by Gelenius *sua cuique ratio*, every man's own reason, as if this were the thing whereby he is the cause of moral evil. He taking it for granted that Origen's hegemonic in every man is reason, which is a thing commonly supposed to be natural and necessary in its perception, whereas necessary nature can be no foundation for blame and punishment. And if moral evil were to be imputed wholly to necessary nature, then must that, and the blame of it, needs be imputed to God himself, as the cause thereof. Whereas Origen's design here, and elsewhere, is to free both God and nature from the blame of moral evils, and cast it upon men themselves, as being something besides necessary nature, loose and at their own disposal, and therefore ἀρχαὶ πράξεων, principles of action; and thus, according to Origen, every man's own hegemonic, or that which rules or commands in his soul, is the only cause of moral evil, vice, or wickedness, which is truly evil, as also are the actions that proceed from it. And in strictness or exactness of philosophy, saith he, there is nothing else evil to a man, that is nothing besides the evil of sin and fault. But I know saith he that this is a matter of great subtlety and nicety, and therefore it would be an operose thing to explain it, &c. and requires longer ambages of discourse than would be proper for this place. Now the herd of modern philosophers and theologers, who zealously maintain the phenomenon of *liberum arbitrium*, or freewill, think there is no other way to do it but only to make an indifferent and blind will fortuitously determining itself, to be both the first mover, and the hegemonic or ruling principle in the soul too. Nevertheless they themselves acknowledge that there is so much of necessary nature even in this blind and fortuitous will, that it is notwithstanding always determined to good, or some appearance of it, and can never possibly choose evil when represented to it by the understanding as wholly such. But within that latitude and compass of apparent good in the understanding, the will to them is free to determine itself to either greater or lesser, and so to any of the lowest degrees and appearances thereof. Nay, though a thing have never so much more of good than evil appearing in it, yet the least glimpse of good glimmering in it, is enough for the blind will to exercise its lordly and unaccountable liberty in preferring it, before such another good as hath not any the least shadow of evil apprehended in it. And when any great end is proposed, and upon deliberation concerning means, it clearly appears to the understanding that there is one means, which, if chosen, cannot fail but reach and attain to that end; but another, which is only not impossible to do it, but hath ten thousand to one odds against it, in this case they say it is the perfection of the

* The reference is to Spencer's ed. 4to., Camb. 1677. Par. ed. fol. 1733, i, p. 554., cont. Cels. iv. § 66.

blind indifferent will to be able to determine itself fortuitously that way as well as the other.

But as it is very absurd to make active indifference blindly and fortuitously determining itself, that is active irrationality and nonsense, to be the hegemonic and ruling principle in every man; and as it is indeed impossible there should be any such thing in nature as a blind faculty of will, which does nothing else but will, acting temerarily or fortuitously, where there are different degrees of good and evil in the objects such as shall be perfectly indifferent to never so much greater or lesser good, a will that is nothing else but will, mere impetus force and activity without any thing of light or understanding, a will which acts both it knows not why or wherefore, and even it knows not what; so could not such a blind, indifferent, and fortuitous will ruling salve the phenomenon of moral good and evil of commendation or blame. Because this being supposed to be the perfection of this will, its own nature, and a man's essential liberty and privilege to act thus, there can be no fault nor blame in him for his exercising the same, and acting according to his nature—no nature being sin.

Wherefore it cannot be supposed that the hegemonic, or ruling principle in a man is utterly devoid of all light, and perception, or understanding; notwithstanding which, in peccable beings reason, understanding, and knowledge, as such, or as necessary nature cannot be the only hegemonic or ruling principle. Because reason, as such, can never act unreasonably, understanding, as such, and clear perceptions, can never err. There is no such thing as false knowledge, nor erroneous understanding, nor can sin ever be the result of reason, understanding, clear perceptions, and knowledge, any more than error. Nor is error any more from God and the necessary nature of understanding, than sin is. But the hegemonic of created souls may err, and judge falsely, and sin. Moreover we know, by certain experience, that speculation or deliberation about particular things is determined by ourselves both as to objects and exercise; we can call it off from one thing, and employ it or set it a work upon another, and we can surcease, suspend, and stop the exercise of it when we please too, diverting ourselves into action. From whence it is plain that there is something in us superior thereunto, something more universal and comprehensive, and yet withal more simple, which is hegemonic to it, and doth manage and determine the same.

X. I say, therefore, that the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν in every man, and indeed that which is properly, we ourselves, (we rather having those other things of necessary nature than being them), is the soul as comprehending itself, all its concerns and interests, its abilities and capacities, and holding itself, as it were, in its own hand, as it were redoubled upon itself, having a power of intending or exerting itself more or less, in consideration and deliberation, in resisting the lower appetites that oppose it, both of utility, reason, and honesty; in self-recollection and attention, and vigilant circumspection, or standing upon our guard, in purposes and resolutions, in diligence in carrying on steady designs and active endeavours, in order to self-improvement and the self-promoting of its own good, the fixing and conserving itself in the same. Though by accident and by abuse, it often proves a self-impairing power, the original of sin, vice, and wickedness; whereby men become to themselves the causes of their own evil, blame, punishment, and misery. Wherefore this

hegemonicon always determines the passive capability of men's nature one way or other, either for better or for worse; and has a self-forming and self-framing power by which every man is self-made into what he is, and accordingly deserves either praise or dispraise, reward or punishment.

Now I say, in the first place, that a man's soul as hegemonical over itself, having a power of intending and exerting itself more or less in consideration and deliberation, when different objects, or ends, or mediums, are propounded to his choice, that are in themselves really better and worse, may, upon slight considerations and immature deliberations, (he attending to some appearance of good in one of them without taking notice of the evils attending it), choose and prefer that which is really worse before the better, so as to deserve blame thereby. But this not because it had by nature an equal indifferency and freedom to a greater or lesser good, which is absurd; or because it had a natural liberty of will either to follow or not follow its own last practical judgment, which is all one as to say a liberty to follow or not follow its own volition. For upon both these suppositions there would have been no such thing as fault or blame. But here also the person being supposed to follow the greater apparent good at this time, and not altogether to clash with his last practical judgment neither. But because he might have made a better judgment than now he did, had he more intensely considered, and more maturely deliberated, which, that he did not, was his own fault. Now to say that a man hath not this power over himself to consider and deliberate more or less, is to contradict common experience and inward sense. And to deny that a man is blameworthy for inward temerity, in acting in any thing of moment without due and full deliberation, and so choosing the worsen is absurd. But if a man have this power over himself to consider and deliberate more or less; then is he not always determined thereunto by any antecedent necessary causes. These two things being inconsistent and contradictions, and consequently there was something of contingency in the choice.

From what has been declared it appears that though perception be nature or necessary understanding in us, yet for all that, we are not merely passive to our own practical judgments and to the appearances of good, but contribute something of our own to them such as they are. Because these may be very different accordingly as we do more or less intensely consider or deliberate which is a thing ἐφ' ἑμῶν in our own power. A man who does but slightly consider, may hastily choose that as better, which upon more serious and leisurely consideration he would judge should be refused as what is much the worsen. The same motives and reasons propounded have not always the same force and efficacy upon different persons, nor yet upon the same persons neither at several times, but more or less as they are differently apprehended, or more or less attended to pondered or considered, which we are not merely passive to, but determined by ourselves.

Besides which, it is certain, that in our practica judgments we often extend ourselves or assents further than our understanding as necessary nature goes; that is, further than our clear and distinct perceptions. For when upon a slighter consideration we are sometimes become doubtful which of two or more things should be preferred, not clearly discerning at that time any greater eligibility in one than another of them, though in reality there were

much difference, we are not hereupon necessitated to arrest and stop and suspend action, but may and often do proceed to making a judgment in the case one way or other, stochastically or conjecturally (which itself is not without some contingency neither) and so go forward to action.

It hath seemed very strange to some, what Cartesius hath written that it is not the understanding but the will that judgeth, and that this is the cause of error as well as of sin. And indeed this may well seem strange according to that notion which men commonly have of will, as a mere blind faculty. But it is most certain that even in speculative things, about truth and falsehood, as well as practical, the hegemonic of the soul (which is the soul itself comprehensive, and having the conduct and management of itself in its own hand) doth sometimes extend itself further in way of assent than the necessary understanding goes, or beyond clear and distinct perception. That is when we have no clear and distinct conception of the truth of a proposition (which is the knowledge of it and can never be false) we may notwithstanding, extend our assents further and judge stochastically, that is opine, this way or that way concerning it, and that sometimes with a great deal of confidence and assurance too. And this is undoubtedly the original of all error in speculative things also, which cannot be imputed to necessary nature in us without casting the blame of them upon God the maker of it. The understanding as necessary nature in us, or clear distinct conception, can never err, because there cannot possibly be any clear conception of falsehood in eternal things as geometry and metaphysics, clear conceptibility is the essence of truth, and clear distinct conception is knowledge, which can never be false. Wherefore if we did always suspend our assents, when we had no clear distinct conceptions of the connexion between the predicate and subject of a proposition, we should never err. But we do often opine and judge stochastically, concerning truth and falsehood even in speculative things, beyond our clear conceptions and certain knowledge. That of Aristotle, ἡ κακιά φθαρτικὴ τῶν ἀρχῶν, and the common opinion that interest and vicious inclinations bribe the judgment shows that the judging power in us is not the understanding or necessary nature in us for then it could not be bribed, corrupted, and swayed. And indeed the necessary understanding that is our clear conception and knowledge going so little way, there is need and use of this stochastical judging and opining concerning truth and falsehood in human life going further and beyond it, our actions and volitions depending much upon our speculative opinions concerning the truth and falsehood of things. The weakness of human understanding is such that there are very few things which men do so certainly know as that no manner of doubt may be raised in their minds against them, either by sophistical arguments or bigotry in religion. Hence is it that divine faith is so much commended to us in the Gospel which is undoubtedly an assent to things beyond clear conception and certain necessary knowledge. The belief of the existence of a God, of the natural immortality of the soul, and consequently of rewards and punishments after this life, are things which the generality of mankind have no clear conceptions nor demonstrative science of. And yet they are highly necessary to be believed in order to a morally virtuous and good life. And it was truly and wisely said by Plato that,

πίστις and ὀρθὰι δόξαι*, faith and true opinions are things no less useful and effectual in life, than certain science and demonstrations. Nevertheless it cannot be denied, but that by the rash and uncautious use of this power of the hegemonic in our souls, of extending its assent further than our clear conception, and beyond our understanding as necessary nature in us, we frequently fall into many errors, which errors are therefore no more to be imputed to God than our sins are, they being not from necessary nature as made by him, but from the ill conduct or management of ourselves, and the abuse of that αὐτεξούσιον, or *sui potestas* that larger power, which we have over ourselves, given for necessary uses and purposes, in extending our assents and judgments beyond our clear conception, understanding, or knowledge, without sufficient grounds: and there may be very sufficient grounds sometimes to believe beyond knowledge, as well as beyond sense and yet notwithstanding is this divine faith a virtue or grace.

XI. Again in that contest betwixt the dictate of honesty or of conscience, and the suggestion of the lower appetites urging and impelling to pleasure or present good or profit, I say in this contest there is no necessary understanding interposing and coming in to umpire between, that does unavoidably and irresistibly determine one way or other. But the matter wholly depends upon the soul's hegemonic or power over itself, its exerting itself with more or less force and vigour in resisting these lower affections, or hindering the gratification of them, according to which the issue or event of action will be determined. But this is not one single battle or combat only, but commonly a long lasting or continued war and colluctation betwixt the higher and the lower principle, in which there are many vicissitudes, reciprocations, and alternations upward and downward, as in the scales of a pair of balances, before there come to be a perfect conquest on either side, or fixation and settling of the soul either in the better or the worse. During which struggling and colluctation was that pronounced, *The good that I would do I do not, the evil that I would not do that do I*. And then according to the issue of this intestine war will men either receive praise from God or deserve blame and punishment from him, glory and honour to him that doeth well, but tribulation and anguish to every soul that doeth evil. And *I have fought a good fight and now there is laid up for me a crown of life*. And that we have a power more and less to exert ourselves to resist the lower inclinations, or hinder the gratifications of them, and to comply with the dictate of conscience or honesty, we being not wholly determined therein by necessary causes antecedent, but having something at least of it ἐφ' ἡμῖν, in our own power, every man's own conscience bears witness, in accusing and condemning him whenever he does amiss. Whereas it is plain that if we be determined by necessity of nature here, then is there nothing in our own power, nor can we be blameworthy or deserve punishment.

Moreover we are certain by internal sense, that our souls as comprehending themselves, and hegemonical or having a ruling power over themselves, can exert themselves more or less

* Δόξα ἄρα ἀληθής, πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμῶν φρονήσεως. Plato Meno.

in self-recollection, self-attention, heedfulness and animadvertence, in vigilant circumspection, in fortifying themselves in firmness of purpose beforehand, in carrying on and pursuing steady designs of life, in exciting endeavours, in activity and diligence of execution. Now when men are commended for diligence, industriousness, studious endeavours, firmness and steadiness of resolution in good, vigilant circumspection, and blame for the contrary, viz. negligence, remissness, supineness, inattention, carelessness, &c. These things are imputed to the men themselves, as the causes of things are, and as not being determined by necessary causes as much as the notions of a watch or clock are.

XII. But besides internal sense and common notions, the same thing is confirmed by the Scriptures, not only apochryphal, but canonical also. The genuine sense of the ancient Jewish church herein appeareth from this of Jesus the son of Sirach, ch. xv. 11. *Say not it is through the Lord that I fall away. For thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou he hath caused me to err, for he hath no need of the sinful man. The Lord hateth all abomination, and they that fear God love it not. Himself made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his counsel. If thou wilt to keep the commandments and to perform acceptable faithfulness, he hath set fire and water before thee, stretch forth thy hand unto whether thou wilt. Before man is life and death and whether him liketh shall be given him.* Which latter passage seems to refer to that of Moses, Deut. xxx. 15, 16. *See I have set before thee this day life and good, death and evil. In that I command thee to love the Lord thy God, to walk in his ways and keep his commandments.* (v. 19) *I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life that thou and thy seed may live.* Here by leaving man in the hand of his own counsel is plainly asserted an *αὐτεξούσιον*, or *sui potestas*, a power of determining himself towards the better or the worse, life or death. With which agreeth Solomon himself, Prov. xvi. 32. *He that ruleth his own spirit is more mighty than he that taketh a city.* He that is *κρείσσων ἑαυτῷ*, superior to himself, or a conqueror over his inferior passions irascible and concupiscible. This implies a kind of duplicity in the human soul, one, that which is ruled, another, that which ruleth, or the soul to be as it were reduplicated upon itself, and so hegemonical over itself; having a power to intend itself more or less in resisting the lower appetites, which cannot be without something of contingency or non-necessity. Were the soul necessarily and essentially good and impeccable, he would be above this self power, were he nothing but lust, appetite, and *horme*, he would be below it. Now he is in a middle state a perfection betwixt both. He hath some power to keep under his body and bodily lusts, 1 Cor. ix. 27. To mortify his members that are upon the earth, Col. iii. 5. To gird up the loins of his mind, 1 Pet. i. 13. To add something to himself, 2 Pet. i. 5. *Add to your faith virtue, knowledge.* To improve these talents which he hath received from God, and to return to him his own with usury, Matt. xxv. To purge himself, 2 Tim. ii. 21. *If a man purge himself from these he shall be a vessel of honour.* To cleanse ourselves from filthiness of flesh and spirit, 2 Cor. vii. 1. To keep himself pure, 1 Tim. v. 22. To keep himself unspotted from the world, Jam. i. 27. To keep ourselves in the love of God, Jude 21. To keep himself that that wicked one touch him not, 1 Joh. v. 18. To overcome, Apoc. ii. 7. In these places it is plain that the soul of man hath a reciprocal energy upon itself, or of acting upon itself. So that it is not

merely passive to that which it receives from God, of being a co-worker with God, a power of improving itself further and further, and of keeping and conserving itself in good, all which cannot be without a nonnecessity or contingency.

XIII. This faculty of αὐτεξούσιον, or *sui potestas*, or power over ourselves, which belongs to the hegemonicon of the soul, or the soul as reduplicated upon itself, and self-comprehensive, whereby it can act upon itself, intend and exert itself more or less, and by reason thereof judge, and will, and act differently, is intended by God and nature for good, as a self-promoting self-improving power in good, and also a self-conserving power in the same, whereby men [receive] praise of God, and their persons being justified and sins pardoned through the merits and true propitiatory sacrifice [of Christ, they] have a reward graciously bestowed on them by God even a crown of life. Notwithstanding which by accident and by the abuse of it, it proves that, whereby men also come to be unto themselves the causes of their own sin, of guilt, blame, and punishment. The objects of God's vindicative justice, that which will especially be displayed in that great day of judgment which is to come. The justice of which day of judgment to punish men for the past actions of their wicked lives can no otherwise be defended than by asserting such an hegemonicon in the soul, as whereby it has a power over itself or a freedom from necessity.

XIV. It appears from what I have declared that this *liberum arbitrium* of freewill, which is properly an αὐτεξούσιον or *sui potestas*, a power over oneself either of intending or remitting and consequently of determining ourselves better or worse, which is the foundation of commendation or blame, praise or dispraise, and the object of retributive justice, remunerative or judicative, rewarding or punishing, is not a pure perfection, (as many boast it to be) but hath a mixture of imperfection in it. So that it cannot belong to God or a perfect being to have a self intending and self remitting power, a self improving and self impairing power, a self advancing and self depressing, to deserve praise commendation and reward on the one hand, (it being observed by Aristotle that it does not properly belong to God εἰσὶν ὡς μακαρίζεσθαι) much less to deserve blame and punishment. But to be mutable or changeable in way of diminution, lapsable or peccable, is an essential property of a rational imperfect being. Moreover a perfect being cannot have any such power of stretching its judgment beyond certain knowledge, or of eking out the defect of knowledge or understanding, and supplying or lengthening it out by faith and probable opinion. A perfect being can neither be more nor less in intention, being a pure act it can have no such thing as self recollection, vigilance, circumspection or diligence in execution, but it is immutable or unchangeable goodness, and wisdom undefectible. Arius and his followers maintaining the Logos, the word and Son of God by which all things were made, to be a creature, did consentaneously thereunto assert that he was endowed with this kind of *liberum arbitrium*, whereby he was mutable, lapsable, and peccable. But the Nicene fathers, defending the true Godhead or divinity of the Logos, decreed on the contrary that being not lapsable, nor peccable, he was not endowed with that *liberum arbitrium* which is an essential property of

every rational or intelligent creature. Accordingly as Origen had before declared that the Logos, being essentially wise, could therefore never degenerate into folly. And the Holy Ghost, being essentially holy in itself, could never degenerate into unholiness, and so neither of them could have that *liberum arbitrium* which is the original of lapsability and peccability. And thus St. Jerome, *Solus Deus peccare non potest, cætera, quia libero arbitrio prædita sunt, possunt in utramque partem se flectere.*

But some there are who persuade themselves that the perfection of the Deity consisteth in being indifferent to all things, altogether undetermined by any antecedent motives or reasons of goodness, wisdom, or truth, and itself to be the sole determiner of all these by an indifferent, arbitrary, contingent and fortuitous will. And this is that monstrous and prodigious idea or portraiture of God which Cartesius hath drawn out in his metaphysics. That there is *nulla ratio veri aut boni* in nature antecedent to his will. So that according to him, God is both good and wise by will, and not by any nature; a being nothing but blind, indifferent, and fortuitous will; omnipotent. And all divine perfections are swallowed up into will; that a triangle hath three angles equal to two right angles, that equals added to equals make equals, or that two and two are not four otherwise than according to his will, because they were made such by an arbitrary decree of God Almighty. Whereas according to Scripture God is a nature of infinite love, goodness, or benignity, displaying itself according to infinite and perfect wisdom, and governing all creatures in righteousness, and this is liberty of the Deity, so that it consisteth not in infinite indifferency blindly and arbitrarily determining all things. There is a nature of goodness, and a nature of wisdom antecedent to the will of God, which is the rule and measure of it. But this hypothesis of Cartesius alike overthrows all morality and science at once, making truth and falsehood as well as the moral differences of good and evil mere arbitrary things, will and not nature; [it] thereby also destroys all faith and trust or confidence in God, as well as the certainty of Christian religion.

Upon this ground or principle, of God having an arbitrary contingent freewill to all things, did some of the Arian party endeavour to overthrow the divinity of the Son or Word. Because God must needs beget him unwillingly, unless he begot him by an arbitrary contingent freewill, which would make him have a precarious existence, and to be destroyable again at pleasure, and consequently to be a creature. But Athanasius and the other catholic fathers in opposition hereunto, maintained that God the Father begot a Son not by arbitrary freewill, but by way of natural emanation, incorporeal, and yet not therefore unwillingly, nor yet without will neither, but his will and nature here concurring and being the same; it being both a natural will and will-ing nature. So that the Son begotten thus from eternity by the essential fœcundity of the Father and his overflowing perfection, (which is no necessity imposed upon him, nor yet a blind and stupid nature, as that of fire burning or the sun shining), this divine *apaugasma*, or outshining splendour of God the Father hath no precarious, but a necessary existence, and is undestroyable. Whereas all creatures, having once had a beginning, cannot possibly have a necessary, existence, were it only for this reason, because they once were not. But besides this there can be no repugnance, but that what once was not, might not be again, or be reduced to non-existence by that which gave

it a being out of nothing. Wherefore though it should be affirmed that creatures also did proceed by way of emanation from the Deity, as being a kind of λόγος προφορικὸς of God Almighty, yet was this emanation of another kind from that natural and necessary emanation of the Son, namely a voluntary emanation, suspendible. Nor can it be denied but that God Almighty might by his absolute power annihilate this whole creation:—As suppose, if all rational creatures should degenerate, (as a great part have done), and continue obstinately in their apostasy, (as a late sect supposeth the annihilation of wicked men's souls after the day of judgment, concluding this to be the second death threatened), and then instead thereof create another world of rational creatures, which conceit of other worlds created before this from eternity, hath not only been owned by the Stoics asserting an infinite vicissitude and revolution of worlds, one after another, all new as to the rational creatures in them, but also hath been surmised by some of the Christian profession, Origen himself having some umbrage of it.

All will is generally acknowledged to have this naturally or necessarily belonging to it, to be determinated in good, as its object; it being impossible that any intelligent being should will evil as such. Therefore it seems both rational and pious to conceive that the best of all beings, who is essentially good and wise, should always act agreeably to its own nature, and therefore will the best, and consequently make the world in the best manner that it was capable of. Some indeed will needs pretend that God does not always do the best, because they suppose this to be an essential freedom and liberty in him, to be indifferent to will either the better or the worser. Which is all one as to say he is indifferent to act either, according to his own wisdom and goodness or not. But none of these men, nor any Atheists either, were ever yet able to show how the workmanship of God in any part of the world, or in their own bodies, could have been mended in the least thing that is. Nor can God's providence in the government of rational creatures be suspected not to be the best, by any who believe that he hath appointed a day wherein he will judge the world in righteousness, and without respect of persons render to every man according to his works. When Moses tells us of God pronouncing of everything that he made, that it was **טוב מאד** *very good*, (Gen. i. 31.) We are to understand the meaning to be, that it was the best, the Hebrews having no other way to express the superlative.

Notwithstanding which, arbitrary and contingent liberty is not quite excluded from the Deity by us, there being many cases in which there is no best, but a great scope and latitude for things to be determined either this way, or that way, by the arbitrary will and pleasure of God Almighty. As for instance, the world being supposed to be finite, (as it can no more be infinite than it could be eternal), that it should be just of such a bigness, and not a jot less or bigger, is by the arbitrary appointment of God, since no man can with reason affirm that it was absolutely best that it should have been not so much as an inch or hair's-breadth bigger or lesser than it is. The number of the stars must needs be either even or odd, but it cannot be said that either of them is absolutely in itself the best. Nor yet that the number of those nebulous *stellæ*, that appear to our sight as small as pindust, should be just so many as they are, and neither one more or less. So likewise the number of created angels and human souls,

or that every one of us had a being and a consciousness of ourselves, must needs be determined by the arbitrary will and pleasure of the Deity, who can obliterate and blot any one of us out again out of being, and yet the world not be a jot the less perfect by it. However we may readily bear a part and join with the four and twenty elders in the apocalypse falling down before the throne, in that song of theirs, *Thou art worthy O Lord to receive glory and honour and power, for thou hast created all things, καὶ διὰ θέλησιν σου, for thy will (or pleasure) they are and were created.* Though all things in the universe had not been arbitrarily made such as they are, but according to the best art and wisdom, yet were they not therefore less *διὰ τὴν θέλησιν Θεοῦ*, for the will of God. It being his will to make them according to his wisdom; or to order all things in number, measure, and weight. Wisdom, xi. 20.

XV. The instances of the *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν*, as the Greeks call them, such things as are contingent or unnecessary, have been frequently given in inanimate bodies that have no self moving nor self changing power, and therefore can never be moved nor changed but, as to themselves, necessarily. As for example, that it may either rain or not rain to-morrow, that the wind may then blow either from the north or from the south, these and such like inferences have been commonly given by ancient writers (as well as modern) who assert contingency against the Democritical or Stoical fate or necessity of all actions; but as I conceive very improperly; for though there be in nature a possibility of either of these, and there is an uncertainty to us which of them will be, yet whichsoever of them at any time comes to pass, cometh not to pass by any contingent liberty of its own, but is determined necessarily by natural causes antecedent, or without. As for that other common instance of the cast* of a die; here is no contingency or non-necessity neither in the motion of the die after it be out of the caster's hand, though it be uncertain to us which side will fall uppermost. But there may be an antecedent contingency in the posture, force, or impulse of the thrower, which is to be distinguished from the motion of the die itself. No body that is by nature *ἑτεροκινητὸν*, always moved by something else, and never originally from itself, can have a contingency or non-necessity in its own motion, as such, though it may be contingently moved by something else, having a power over its own action, to determine the same.

Wherefore there cannot possibly be anything more senseless and absurd than the doctrine of Epicurus, who asserting a contingent liberty of willing in all animals, free from fate and necessity, derived the original thereof from a contingent declination of senseless atoms from the perpendicular, more or less, and uncertainly this way or that way.

*Sed ne res ipsa necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis,
Et devicta quasi cogatur ferre, patique;
Id facit exiquum clinamen principiorum
Nec regione loci certa, nec tempore certo †.*

* See Hobbes' Treatise of Necessity, Works, fol. ed., Lon. 1750, p. 484.

† Lucr. Rer. Nat. ii., 289.-293.

And this forsooth upon this pretence, lest anything should come from nothing, or be made without a cause:—

*Quare in seminibus quoque, idem fateare necesse est,
Esse aliam præter plagas, et pondera causam
Motibus, unde hæc est nobis innata potestas,
De nihilo quoniam fieri nihil posse videmus *.*

Wherefore for the avoiding contingent liberty coming from nothing, or being without a cause, he assigns it an impossible cause, for nothing can be more impossible than this, that a senseless atom which hath no self moving power, should have in it a contingent liberty of moving this way or that way.

Nevertheless it may well be questioned whether there may not be something of contingency or non-necessity in the actions of brute animals, though it be out of question that they have nothing of morality or moral freewill in them. We did before take notice of certain kind of liberty from necessity, where blame or commendation had no place, called by some of the ancients epeleustic, where there being an equal eligibility in several objects without the least difference, we can determine ourselves fortuitously to either of them. Now it is not easy to exclude brute animals from such a contingency as this, because there may be objects proposed to them (as of meat and drink) so exactly equal, and placed at such equal distances for a considerable time, as that it cannot be conceived what physical cause there should be necessarily to determine them at last to either of them, or to this rather than that, and yet they will not hang in suspense but certainly do one or other. So again where they are distracted betwixt an equal fear and aversation on one side, and equal hope or desire on the other, at the same time, as a dog betwixt a whip and a bone, they will not always continue in demur and suspense, though the scales be exactly even, and a perfect *isorrope* as to motives and causes; but there will after a determination, sometimes one way, sometimes another, which cannot well be thought necessary without anything of fortuitous contingency.

Moreover Epicurus was of opinion, that as well brute animals as men had a power over themselves, of intending themselves more or less to their sensual or animal good, fancied by them:—

*Nonne vides etiam patefactis tempore puncto,
Carceribus, non posse tamen prorumpere equorum
Vim cupidam tam de subito, quam mens avet ipsa †?*

Where he conceived that brutes were not merely passive to their own fancies and *hormæ*, but that they could add something of their own to them more or less, and actively intend themselves beyond what they suffered, or what was by nature impressed upon them; which

* *Lucr. Rer. Nat. ii., 284-287.*

† *Lucr. Rer. Nat. ii., 262-264.*

if it be so, then must there be something in brutes superior to their *hormæ*, some one thing which taking notice both of outward objects by sense, and of its own fancies and *hormæ*, can intend them more or less; and add more or less to them.

And there may seem to be some further probability of this from hence, because we find by experience that brutes are many of them docible, and can acquire habits to do many things even to admiration. Now fancies and *hormæ* as such are not capable of habits, no more than of freewill, and therefore that which these habits are in, and which thus determines their motions (and their *hormæ* too) must be a kind of hegemonic in the acting probably not without some contingency. However it is not easy to believe that every wagging of a dog's tail, every motion of a wanton kitling sportfully playing and toying, or of a flea skipping, hath such a necessary cause, as that it could none of them possibly have been otherwise.

XVI. But whatever be the case of brute animals as to this particular, whose insides we cannot enter into; yet we being in the inside of ourselves do know certainly by inward sense that there is in us some one hegemonical, which comprehending all the other powers, energies, and capacities of our soul, in which ἀνακεφαλαιοῦνται, they are recollected and as it were summed up, having a power of intending and exerting itself more or less, determineth, not only actions, but also the whole passive capability of our nature one way or other, either for the better or the worse. And I say that according to reason there must of necessity be such a thing as this in men, and all imperfect rational beings, or souls vitally united to bodies. For there being so many several faculties and different kinds of energies in them; as the sensitive perception of outward objects together with bodily pleasure and pain, sudden fancies and *hormæ*, appetites and passions towards a present seeming good, or against a present apparent evil, rising up in us, or coming upon us and invading us with great force and urgency; then the free reason of our private utility, which discovering inconveniences present and future attending them, often contradicts these appetites of a present sensual good. Again, the superior dictate of honesty, which many times is inconsistent both with the appetites of pleasure and the reason of private utility. Besides these, a speculative power of contemplating *de omni ente et non ente*, of whatsoever is and is not in nature, and of the truth and falsehood of things universal, whence it obtrudes on us the notice of a God and his existence as the object of religion, the substantiality or permanent subsistence of our own souls after the body's decay:—lastly a deliberating power of what is to be done in life in order to the promoting of our own good and upon emergent occasions. I say there being so many wheels in this machine of our souls, unless they be all aptly knit and put together, so as to conspire into one, and unless there be some one thing presiding over them, intending itself more or less, directing, and ordering, and giving the fiat for action, it could not go forwards in motion, but there must be a confusion and distraction in it, and we must needs be perpetually in puzzle. We should be like to a disjointed machine or automaton all whose wheels are not well set together; which therefore will be either at a stand continually, or else go on very slowly heavily and cumbersomely. It could never carry on evenly any steady designs, nor manage itself orderly and agreeably in undertaking, but would be altogether a

thing inapt for action.

If appetites and passion rise necessarily from objects without, and the reason of private utility did necessarily suggest something contrary to them from the consideration of other present inconveniences or future ill consequences, were there not some middle thing here to interpose to umpire between them we must of necessity be nonplussed and at a stand. But if either of these by superiority of strength did always necessarily prevail over the other, then would that other be altogether useless and superfluous, and so the whole a bungle in nature.

The case is the same as to the clashing and discord betwixt the superior dictate of honesty and conscience and that of sensual pleasure or private utility. If these two be equiponderant as scales in a balance, and there be no hand to turn or cast in grains of advantage either way, then must the machine of the soul be at a stand; but if one of them do always necessarily preponderate the other, then is the lighter altogether idle and to no purpose.

Again, if speculative and deliberative thought be always necessary in us, both as to exercise and specification then must it be either because they are all necessarily produced and determined by objects of sense from without, according to the doctrine of Democritus and Hobbian atheists, or else because the understanding always necessarily worketh of itself upon this or that object, and passeth from one object to another by a necessary series or train and concatenation of thoughts. Upon supposition of the former, we could never think of anything, nor speak a word at any time but what objects of sense without did obtrude upon us unavoidably. We could never divest our own thoughts, nor stop the inundation of them flowing in a stream from objects, nor entertain any constant design of life, nor carry on any projects for the future; we being only passive to the present objects of sense before us, all our thoughts being all scribbled or stamped upon our souls by them as upon a sheet of paper. But if the latter of these be supposed, then could we never have any presence of mind, no ready attention to emergent occurrences or occasions, but our minds would be always roving or rambling out, we having no power over them to call them back from their stragglings, or fix them and determine them on any certain objects.

Lastly, if we could not intend ourselves in diligence of activity and endeavours, more or less set ourselves to pursue any purpose or design, fortify our minds with resolution, excite ourselves to watchfulness and circumspection, recollect ourselves more and less in considering all our interests and concerns, if we could not from ourselves exert any act of virtue or devotion for which we should truly deserve praise, nor any act of sin for which we should justly deserve blame, we should be but *tanquam nervis alienis mobile lignum*, dead machines moved by gimmers and wires.

To conclude, God Almighty could not make such a rational creature as this is, all whose joints, springs, and wheels of motion were necessarily tied together, which had no self-power, no hegemonic or ruling principle, nothing to knit and unite the multifarious parts of the machine into one, to steer and manage the conduct of itself; no more than he could have made all the birds of the air only with one wing all the beasts of the field, horses, and other cattle with three legs, for the idea of these things is nothing so unapt as that of an imperfect

rational being, all whose powers and wheels of actions are necessarily tied together, which hath no one thing presiding and governing in it, having a self-intending, and self-determining, and self-promoting power.

Wherefore this ἀὐτεξούσιον, *sui potestas*, self power, commonly called liberty of will, is no arbitrary contrivance, or appointment of Deity, merely by will annexed to rational creatures, but a thing which of necessity belongs to the idea or nature of an imperfect rational being. Whereas a perfect being, essentially good and wise, is above this freewill or self-power, it being impossible that it should ever improve itself much less impair itself. But an imperfect rational being, which is without this self-power, is an inept mongrel and monstrous thing, and therefore such a thing as God could not make. But if he would make any imperfect rational creatures, he must of necessity endue them with an *hegemonicon* or self ruling power. Wherefore that which by accident follows from abuse of this power cannot be imputed to God Almighty as the cause of it, viz. sin, and vice, and wickedness. Since he must either make no imperfect rational beings at all, or else make them such who may be lapsable and peccable by their own default.

XVII. I have now but one thing more to add, and that is to take notice of a common mistake which learned men have been guilty of, confounding this faculty of freewill with liberty as it is a state of pure perfection, for what is more common than in writings both ancient and modern, to find men creaking and boasting of the ἐξουσιὰ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, the liberty of contrariety, *i. e.* to good or evil, as if this was really a liberty of perfection, to be in an indifferent equilibrious state to do good or evil moral, which is too like the language of the first tempter, *Thou shalt be as God knowing good and evil*. Whereas the true liberty of a man, as it speaks pure perfection, is when by the right use of the faculty of freewill, together with the assistances of Divine grace, he is habitually fixed in moral good, or such a state of mind as that he doth freely, readily, and easily comply with the law of the Divine life, taking a pleasure in complacence thereunto, and having an aversion to the contrary: or when the law of the spirit of life hath made him free from the law of sin, which is the death of the soul. But when, by the abuse of that natural faculty of freewill, men come to be habitually fixed in evil and sinful inclinations, then are they, as Boëthius well expresses it, *proprie libertati captivi*, made captive and brought into bondage by their own freewill, and obnoxious to Divine justice and displeasure for the same. Whosoever customarily committeth sin, which is by his own freewill abused or perversely used, contrary to the design of God and nature in bestowing the same upon us, is thereby made the servant of it, and deprived of that true state of liberty which is a man's perfection.

The faculty of freewill is good, whereby men are advanced above the low condition of brute animals, who are under a necessity of following their fancies, *hormæ*, and appetites to a sensual good only, or a good of private selfish utility, they having no sense of that good of honesty and righteousness which is of a different kind from it, but this faculty; being that which is proper to creatures and to imperfect beings only, hath a mixture of creaturely weakness and imperfections in it, and therefore is liable to be abused, so as thereby to become

to ourselves the cause of our own bondage and servitude. Whereas true liberty, which is a state of virtue, holiness, and righteousness (a communicated Divine perfection or participation of the Divine nature) can never be abused.

XVIII. I now proceed to answer all the arguments or objections made against this faculty of the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν or αὐτεξούσιον, the *sui potestas*, or power over ourselves, which infers contingency or non-necessity, and is commonly called *arbitrium* and *liberum arbitrium*—the foundation of praise and dispraise, of retributive justice rewarding and punishing. And this as the matter hath been now already explained by us will be very easy for us to do.

I begin with the pretended grounds why this should be πρᾶγμα ἀνύπαρκτον, a thing which hath no existence in nature, but in itself unintelligible, and absolutely impossible. The first whereof is this, that nothing can move or act any way but as it is moved or acted upon by something else without it. This argument is thus ridiculously propounded by Mr. Hobbes*, *I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without itself.* But his meaning, if he had any meaning, could be no other than this, that no action taketh beginning from the agent itself, but from the action of some other agent without it. Which is all one as if he should say, that no agent acteth from itself, nor otherwise than as it is passive to some other agent without it. That is there is nothing self-moving nor self-acting in the world, nothing that acteth otherwise than as it suffereth, or is made to act by something else without. Now if this proposition be true, it must needs be granted that there can be no contingent liberty or freedom from necessity in nature, but all things will depend upon a chain of causes, each link whereof is necessarily connected, both with what went before, and what follows after, from eternity. But it is certain that this argument makes no more against contingency or non-necessity, then it doth against the existence of a God, or an unmoved mover and first cause of all things. It is of equal force both ways, and therefore if it do substantially and effectually prove the necessity of all actions, then doth it as firmly evince that there is no first unmoved or uncaused cause, that is, no God. And I do not question but that this is the thing which Mr. Hobbes aimed at, though he disguises his design as much as he could in his book, *De Corpore*, ch. xxvi. p. 237. *Etsi ex eo, &c.*, “*Although from hence, that nothing can move itself, it is rightly enough inferred there is a first mover that was eternal: yet nevertheless it cannot be inferred from thence, as it commonly is, that there is any eternal immovable or unmoved mover, but on the contrary, that there is an eternal moved mover, because as it is true that nothing is moved from itself, so is it likewise true that nothing is moved but from another, which was itself also before moved by something else.*” † In which words he doth at once endeavour to transfuse and convey the poison of Atheism, and yet so to do it craftily, that if he be charged with it, he might have some seeming subterfuge or evasion. He saith first,

* *Treatise of Liberty and Necessity*, Works, fol. ed. p. 483.

† Mosheim takes rather a more favourable view of this passage, where he has quoted it in the notes to his translation of the *Intellectual System*. His words are—“*Metuo, ne putent aliqui, non nihil injuriæ illatum esse Hobbesio, si integra ejus verba legant, quæ subjicio: Etsi, inquit, ex eo, quod nihil potest movere se ipsum, satis recte inferetur, primum aliquod esse movens, quod fuerit æternum; non tamen inferetur id, quod inferre solent,*

nempe æternum immobile, sed contra æternum motum: siquidem, ut verum est, nihil moveri a se ipso, ita verum est, nihil moveri, nisi a moto. Elem. Philos. p. iv. sive Physica, cap. 26, § 1, p. 204. Vident, qui hæc verba diligenter considerant, continuo, atrocitatem sententiæ, quam auctori illorum Cudworthus attribuit, illis non nihil diminui. Nec enim (I.) negavit Hobbesius, ex motu demonstrari posse, esse primum aliquod movens, idquæ æternum, sive deum. Neque (II.) dixit, illud primum movens ab aliâ externâ causâ moveri. Etenim diserte affirmat æternum illud esse. Sed hoc (III.) tantum professus est, primum illud movens non esse immobile, verum movere sese, atque, dum sese movet, reliqua corpora propellere. Scilicet Deum esse corporeum statuebat Hobbesius, &c.—Mosheim's Translation, 4to. ed. i. p. 115; fol. ed. i. p. 85. Intell. Syst. ii. § 13.

it is rightly inferred that there is some first eternal mover, which looks very well, but then he doth not stand to this, but contradicts it immediately afterward in denying that there is any eternal immoveable mover, or any other eternal mover but such as was itself before moved by something else—which is all one as to say that there was no first mover, but one thing moved another from eternity, without any beginning, any first mover, any unmoved self-moved mover. For the first mover, if there be indeed any such, must needs be an unmoved mover, which was not itself, before moved or acted by another, but a self-moving mover.

But this whole argument thus at once striking against contingency, and the being of a God both together, and which pretends to be a mathematical demonstrative evidence, is the most egregious piece of ridiculous nonsense that ever was written. For if there be motion in the corporeal world, as there is, and no part of it could ever move itself, then must there of necessity be some unmoved or self-moving thing as the first cause thereof, something which could move or act from itself without being moved or acted upon by another; because if nothing at all could move or act by itself, but only as it was moved or acted upon by another, then could not motion nor action ever begin, or ever have come into the world; but since there is seen motion in the corporeal world, and no part of it could move itself, it must needs either originally proceed from a first unmoved or self-moving mover and cause, or else all of it come from nothing, and be produced without a cause.

But the truth is this, that these unskilful philosophers apply that to all being whatsoever, which is the property of body only, that it cannot move itself, nor otherwise move than as it is caused to move by something else without it, as it cannot stop its motion neither, when it is once imprest upon it, (it being wholly of a passive nature), and from hence it afforded an undeniable demonstration to us*, that there is some incorporeal being, and something unmoved, or self-moving and self-active, as the first cause of all motion and action, such as itself not being moved nor acted by another, can cause body to move locally, and did at first impress such quantity of motion upon the corporeal universe as now there is in it.

XIX. Again, it is objected, that though it should be granted there was something self moving, and self-active, and which was not merely passive to another thing without it, acting upon it, yet for all that, it is not possible that anything should determine itself actively,

* See Intell. Syst. chap. v. p. 844, 845, &c., fol. ed.

change itself, or act upon itself, because one and the same thing cannot be both agent and patient at once.

To which I reply, first, that there is no necessity that what acteth from itself should always act uniformly, or without any difference or change. That in us, which moves the members of our body by cogitation or will, doth not always do it alike, but determineth itself differently therein, acting sometimes on one member sometimes on another, moving sometimes this way sometimes that way, and with more or less celerity and strength, and sometimes arresting motion again. So that nothing can be more plain than that, by determining itself differently, it doth accordingly determine the motion of the body. And it is contrary to the verdict of our inward sense to affirm that, when we thus move our body and members arbitrarily and at pleasure, no one motion of our finger, no nictation of our eyelids, no word spoken by our tongue could ever possibly have been otherwise than it was at that time, but that it was necessarily so determined, by a successive chain of causes from all eternity, or at least from the beginning of the world; much less as Mr. Hobbes further dogmatizes, that there is no one action how casual or contingent soever it seem, to the causing whereof did not at once concur whatsoever is in *rerum naturâ* *.

That which determineth itself and changeth itself may be said to act upon itself, and consequently to be both agent and patient. Now though this cannot possibly belong to a body which never moves itself, but is essentially *ἑτεροκίνητον*, always moved by something else without it, yet nothing hinders but that what is by nature *αὐτοκίνητον*, self-moving and self-active, may also determine its own motion or activity, and so the same be said to be both agent and patient. We are certain by inward sense that we can reflect upon ourselves and consider ourselves, which is a reduplication of life in a higher degree; for all cogitative beings as such are self-conscious; though conscience in a peculiar sense be commonly attributed to rational beings only, and such as are sensible of the *discrimen honestorum* or *turpium* when they judge of their own actions according to that rule, and either condemn or acquit themselves. Wherefore that which is thus conscious of itself, and reflexive upon itself, may also as well act upon itself, either as fortuitously determining its own activity, or else as intending and exerting itself more or less in order to the promoting of its own good.

XX. But it is still further objected that a thing which is indifferent as such can never determine itself to move or act any way, but must needs continue in suspense without action to all eternity. This is an argument which Pomponatius relies much upon to destroy contingent liberty of will, and establish a fatal necessity of all actions.

And here we must again observe that what belongeth to bodies only, is by these philosophers unduly extended to all beings whatsoever. 'Tis true that a body which is unable to move itself, but passively indifferent to receive any motion impressed upon it, once resting must needs continue to rest to all eternity, unless it be determined to this or that motion by something else without. And if it should be impelled different ways at once by two equal forces, it can never be able of itself to move either way. Two scales put into a perfect equal

* Hobbes' Works, fol. ed. p. 481.

poize can neither of them move upward or downward. But it will not therefore follow that if equal motives to action, equal appearances of good offer themselves to a man, he must therefore stand for ever in an *isorrope* or equilibrium, and can never determine himself to act one way or other.

Nevertheless this is a great mistake of Pomponatius* and many others, to think that that liberty of will, which is the foundation of praise or dispraise, must consist in a man's having a perfect indifferency, after all motives and reasons of action propounded, and after the last practical judgment too, to do this or that, to choose the better or the worser, and to determine himself fortuitously either way; for the contingency of freewill doth not consist in such a blind indifferency as this is after the last judgment and all motives of action considered, but it is antecedent thereunto, in a man's intending or exerting himself more or less, both in consideration and in resolution, to resist the inferior appetites and inclinations urging to the worser.

XXI. Another argument used to prove that contingent freewill is a thing that can have no existence in nature is, because it is reasonable to think that all elections and volitions are determined by the reasons of good, and by the appearance of the greater good. Now the reasons and appearances of good are in the understanding only, and therefore are not arbitrary but necessary. Whence it will follow that all elections and volitions must needs be necessary.

But Aristotle himself long since made a question whether all appearances of good were necessary or no. And it is most certain that they are not so. For as we do more or less intend ourselves in consideration and deliberation, and as we do more or less fortify our resolutions to resist the lower appetites and passions, so will the appearances of good and our practical judgments be different to us accordingly. Whence it frequently comes to pass that the same motives and reasons have not the same effect upon different men, nor yet upon the same man at different times, wherefore this is but one of the vulgar errors, that men are merely passive to the appearances of good, and to their own practical judgments.

XXII. Another argument for the natural necessity of all actions much used by the Stoics was this, that οὐδὲν ἀνάγκη nothing can be without a cause, and whatsoever hath a cause must of necessity come to pass. Mr. Hobbes thinks to improve this argument into a demonstration after this manner. Nothing can come to pass without a sufficient cause, and a sufficient cause is that to which nothing is needful to produce the effect, wherefore every sufficient cause must needs be a necessary cause, or produce the effect necessarily†.

To which childish argumentation the reply is easy, that a thing may have sufficient power, or want nothing of power necessary to enable it to produce an effect, which yet may have power also or freedom not to produce it. Nothing is produced without an efficient cause,

* Pomponatius de Fato, iii. § 1. Verum ipsa voluntas, vel quæcunque potentia sit ilia, a nullo alio determinata, indifferenter potest in actus oppositus. See also § 2, 4, 6.

† See Treatise of Liberty and Necessity, Works, fol. ed., Lon. 1750, p. 484.

and such an efficient cause as had sufficiency of power to enable it to produce it. But yet that person, who had sufficient power to produce an effect, might notwithstanding will not to produce it. So that there are two kinds of sufficient causes, one is such as acteth necessarily and can neither suspend nor determine its own action, another such as acteth contingently or arbitrarily, and hath a power over its own action, either to suspend it or determine it as it pleaseth.

I shall subjoin to this another argument, which Mr. Hobbes glories of, as being the sole inventor of. From the necessity of a disjunctive proposition, nothing can be so contingent but that it was necessarily true of it beforehand that it will either come to pass or not come to pass*. Therefore, says he, if there be a necessity in the disjunction, there must be a necessity in one or other of the two parts thereof alone by itself; if there be no necessity that it shall come to pass, then must it be necessary that it shall not come to pass, as if there could not be no necessity in the disjunction, though both the members of it were contingent, and neither of them necessary. This is a most shameful ignorance in logic, especially for one who pretends so much to geometrical demonstration.

And yet this childish and ridiculous nonsense and sophistry of his was stolen from the Stoics too, who played the fools in logic after the same manner. Every proposition, said they, concerning a supposed future contingent, that it will come to pass, was either true or false beforehand and from eternity. If it were true then it must of necessity come to pass, if false then was it necessary that it should not come to pass. And yet this ridiculous sophistry puzzled not only Cicero † but also Aristotle‡ himself, so much as to make them hold that propositions concerning future contingents were neither true nor false ††.

* See Treatise of Liberty and Necessity, Works, fol. ed., Lon. 1750, p. 484.

† Hic primum si mihi libeat assentiri Epicuro, et negare omnem enuntiationem aut veram esse, aut falsam; eam plagam potius accipiam, quam fato omnia fieri comprobem.—*Cis de Fato*, § 10.

‡ εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἀληθής, ἢ ψευδής καὶ ἅπαν ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.—*Aristot. de Interp.* ix. 1.

†† In the question concerning the *certainty* of future, which the Stoics used to infer from the necessity of the *truth or falsehood* of the proposition which predicts them, in order to show the fallacy of this argument it becomes necessary to define exactly the sense in which *truth* is used when we speak of a *true proposition*. And if it be found to mean what all accurate writers define it to be, the agreement of a *representation* with the *thing represented*, there must be some *thing* previously existing, before this idea of truth can be entertained at all. “*Propositio vera QUOD RES EST dicit.*” The original must be antecedent to the representation. An assertion therefore respecting the *future* may be probable or improbable, it may be honest or deceitful, it may be prudent or rash, it may have any relation we please to the mind of the person who makes it or of him who hears it, but it can have no relation at all to a thing which is *not*. Any reasoning therefore which assumes it to bear this sense, which really does not and which in fact cannot belong to it, is illusory. It turns merely upon the equivocation of a word.—*Bishop Coplestone’s Preface to Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination*, p. 14; see also Discourse I., p. 36, 37.

XXIII. I now come to answer the arguments of those, for the necessity of all action, who suppose that though contingent liberty do indeed naturally belong to all rational beings as such, yet notwithstanding the exercise thereof is peculiarly reserved to God Almighty himself only. He from all eternity determining all actions and events whatsoever according to his arbitrary will and pleasure, and so by his irresistible decrees and influx making them necessary, though otherwise in their own nature they would have been contingent.

The first ground of which opinion is this, for a creature to exercise a contingent arbitrary freewill is all one as for it to act independently upon God, wherefore this must needs be reserved to the Deity, as his peculiar privilege and prerogative, arbitrarily and contingently to determine all things, and therefore to make all actions necessary to us. God would not be God, if he did not arbitrarily determine all things.

But first, this is to swallow up all things into God, by making him the sole actor in the universe, all things else being merely passive to him, and determined in their actions by him. This at least is, as Plotinus intimates, to make God the immediate hegemonic, and soul of the whole world.

Again, this is not the supreme perfection of the Deity, to determine all things and actions arbitrarily, contingently, and fortuitously. But to act according to goodness and wisdom, God being infinite disinterested love displaying itself wisely, therefore producing from his fecundity all things that could be made and were fit to be made, suffering them to act according to their own natures, himself presiding over all, and exercising his justice in the management and government of the whole. And since all rational creatures have essentially this property of *liberum arbitrium*, the τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, self power belonging to them, to suppose that God Almighty could not govern the world without offering a constant violence to it, never suffering them to act according to their own nature, is very absurd.

This power of contingent freewill is not independent upon God, but controllable by him at pleasure, as also it is obnoxious and accountable to his justice in punishing the exorbitances of it, and were it not for this, the Divine justice retributive, dispensing rewards and punishments, could have no place in the world, nor no object to exercise itself upon.

Moreover it is certain that God cannot determine and decree all human volitions and actions, but that he must be the sole cause of all the sin and moral evil in it, and men be totally free from the guilt of them. But in truth this will destroy the reality of moral good and evil, virtue and vice, and make them nothing but mere names or mockeries.

XXIV. Again it is objected that if all human actions be neither necessary in themselves, nor yet made such by Divine decrees, they cannot possibly be foreknown by God. Therefore we must needs either deny the Divine omniscience, or deny contingency.

Where in the first place we grant that volitions purely contingent in their own nature, as when the objects or means are perfectly equal, and have no differences of better and worse, being not made necessary by Divine decrees, or influence neither, are not certainly foreknowable *ex causis*. Since that cannot be certainly foreknown *ex causis* which has no

necessary causes. And if contingent volitions be neither certainly foreknowable *ex causis*, nor any way else but are absolutely unforeknowable, then, would it be no more derogatory from the Divine omnipresence, that it cannot know things unknowable, than to the Divine omnipotence, that it cannot do things that are not doable, or that are impossible to be done.

However these things would not be so many as is commonly supposed. For all voluntary actions are not contingent, man's will being always necessarily determined to good, and the aversion of evil, so that there are innumerable cases in human life, in which we may certainly know beforehand what any man in his wits would do, as also many other wherein there can be no doubt but that a good man would do one way, and a man of vicious corrupt principles another way.

Notwithstanding which, though future contingents, be not foreknowable *ex causis*, nor are we able to comprehend how they should be foreknown otherwise, yet would it be great presumption in us therefore flatly to deny Divine prescience of them, because the Divine nature and perfections surpass our human comprehension. We do believe the Divine eternity without beginning, and therefore without successive flux, (for we clearly conceive that whatsoever hath a successive duration, must have had a beginning,) though we cannot comprehend this eternity.

And we believe the Divine omnipresence or ubiquity, though we do not understand the manner of it, since we cannot conceive God to be extended over parts, *extra partes*, numerically distinct and infinite, wherefore it would be pious to believe likewise that God foreknows all future contingent events, though we cannot understand the manner how this should be.

But many learned men and good philosophers have satisfied themselves here, that though events perfectly contingent be not certainly foreknown *ex causis*, yet they are seen and known to God by an anticipation of futurity. The Divine duration of eternity, which is without successive flux, being present to the past and future, as well as to the instant now. He that calls things that are not as if they were, He whose name is ὁ ὄν, ὁ ἦν, καὶ ὁ ἐρχομενος, is, and was, and will be, He who is both past and future, sees all future contingent events in *speculâ eternitatis*, in his high watch tower of eternity, and that there is such a Divine eternity is demonstrable by reason.

XXV. But it is still further urged that upon a supposition of the certain prescience of future contingencies, it will follow unavoidably that they will necessarily come to pass. This is the constant cry of Socinus and his followers, but without the least shadow of reason—for if the prescience be true, they must be foreknown to be contingents, and therefore to come to pass not necessarily but contingently—moreover, they do not therefore come to pass because they are foreknown, but they are foreknown because they will come to pass, the certain prescience is not the cause of their future coming to pass, but their future coming to pass is the cause of their being foreknown. There is no more necessity rising from the prescience, than there would have been from their futurity, had they not been foreknown. For that which now is, though never so contingent, yet since it is, was future from all eternity,

but it was not therefore necessarily future, but contingently only. Here is no necessity but *ex hypothesi*, or hypothetical; upon supposition that it will be, it is necessarily future, but there is no absolute necessity in the thing itself. When a contingent thing hath been, and is now past, it is then necessary that it should have been; or it could not possibly not have been, *ex hypothesi*—so when a contingent action is now a doing, it is at that time necessary that it should be, *ex hypothesi*; but it doth not therefore follow that it was necessarily caused, or that it was impossible not to have been.

XXVI. Again it is objected that the supposition of liberty of will is inconsistent with Divine grace, and will necessarily infer Pelagianism. But the falsity of this may appear from hence, that those angels which by their right use of liberty of will stood, when others by the abuse of it fell, though by that same liberty of will they might still possibly continue without falling, yet for all that, it would not be impossible for them to fall, unless they had aid and assistance of Divine grace to secure them from it, wherefore it is commonly conceived that as, notwithstanding that liberty of will by which it is possible for them never to fall, they had need of Divine grace to secure them against a possibility of falling, and that they are now by Divine grace fixed and confirmed in such a state as that they can never fall.

Much more is the aid and assistance of Divine grace necessary both for the recovery of lapsed souls and for their perseverance; the use of their own freewill is necessarily required, for God, who made us without ourselves, will not save us without ourselves. We are to *strive to enter in at the strait gate, to fight the good fight, and to run a good race, we are to cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of flesh and spirit, we are to keep ourselves in the love of God*. He was certainly an unregenerated person who in the parable had but one talent given him and is condemned for a slothful servant, because he did not by the use of his freewill improve that talent which he had received, and return to his master his own with usury, which had he done more would have been given to him, that is Divine grace would have been superadded; our own endeavours and activity of freewill are insufficient without the addition and assistance of Divine grace, for *it is God which worketh in us both to will and to do, by grace ye are saved, and by the grace of God I am what I am*.

XXVII. There is yet another witty objection, made by a modern writer asserting a fatal necessity of all actions, that whereas liberty of will is introduced to salve a phænomenon of a day of judgment, and the justice of God in inflicting punishment upon men after this life for their actions past, this will by no means serve the turn. I say contingency will no more salve this phænomenon than necessity. For it is no more just that men should be damned to all eternity for a mere chance or contingency, than that they should for necessity; to damn men for their contingent freewilled actions is all one as if one should be damned for throwing such a cast of a die. Men could no more help contingency than necessity. Wherefore the matter can be resolved into nothing else but God's absolute power, and his arbitrary and unaccountable will, which by reason of his omnipotence makes that to be just whatsoever he will do. It seems he thinks not fit to damn men to eternity but such as were necessitated to

do wicked actions before, but he might have done otherwise if he had thought good by his absolute power.

To answer this, no man shall be damned for the contingency of any action where there was no difference of better or worse, a perfect equality and one thing as much eligible as the other; there can be no fault nor blame in this case, as was said before. But where there is an inequality of better or worse, a diversity of good, honesty and duty on one hand, and sensual gain and pleasure on the other, men having a power here over themselves to intend and exert themselves in resisting their sensual appetites, and endeavouring more and more by degrees to comply with the dictates of conscience opposed to them; if at the end of their lives they have run their course as that they have suffered themselves at last to be quite foiled and vanquished by the worser, it is just that they should fall short of the prize set before them, that they should lose the crown, and receive shame, disgrace, and punishment.

Men shall not be damned for the cast of a die or such a fortuitous contingency. But for their not using that power which they have over themselves, to promote themselves towards the good of honesty, and also for their abusing that power, by actively determining and fixing themselves in vicious habits.

NOTE.

NOTE TO SECTION XIV.

THE following verses are worthy of notice, as indicating the bent of Cudworth's studies at the time of his admission to the degree of Doctor of Divinity: they are reprinted from a folio sheet preserved in the British Museum.

DANTUR RATIONES BONI, ET MALI ÆTERNÆ ET
INDISPENSABILES.

Effigies et Forma Dei constantis Honestum
Progenies innata sui, primævius Ævo,
Principiisque prius, nullius jura Parentis
Agnoscit, nullâ derivat origine stirpem.
Non ipsum tandem fœcundâ protulit alvo,
Alma opifex duplicis mundi, Divina Voluntas.
Quin Edicta Boni, quâvis seniora loquelâ,
Imperiis non scita suis, nec jussa volendo
Jura, tremenda colit, nec mente recusat iniquâ
Ipse Deus; facilis Recto summittere Cœli
Æternos fasces, et sceptrâ regentia mundum.
Divinum est servire Bono, placidisque mereri
Obsequiis, nec se Justo subducere posse.
Siste, quis audebit leges præscribere Cœlo?
Quis laqueos mandare Jovi, superisque catenas?
Quis docili cervice jugum perferre Tonantem
Asseret, ætherei juris consultus? an ora
Fræna coercebunt, rerum moderantis habenas?
Nil miri, nec Cœlum ideo domuere Gigantes;
Se regit, et frænat, fines sibi ponit Olympus:
Immensum est mensura sui, sibi regula Rectum;
Is Deus est sibi, qui reliquis; se limite claudit
Virtus inconclusa; sua est angustia Cœlo;
Cancellos Justi capit Infinita Potestas:
Non externa Venus domuit, concreta profundo,
Uritur invicto propriæ Bonitatis amore.
Non sibi dissimiles fore, non exemplar Honesti
Conspicuum delere sui, non linqere tractus
Signatos vellent superi, possentve volentes;
Quos Helice propriâ vestigia certa regente,
Extra se nunquam pellexit devius error.
Sin nullâ ratione regant, discrimine nullo
Jusque nefasque habeant, pro libertate potentes
Elysio donare malos, in Tartara bruto
Fulmine dejicere insontes, non dicere promptum est,
Nil refert Deus, an Terræ moderentur alumni?

Velle nefas non posse, Dei est; sed posse Tyranni.
Quas Idea Boni leges, observat easdem
Umbra coæva Malum Pulchri, et contrarius hostis:
Hæc duo sunt Camarina duplex, defixa profundo,
Non ullis jactanda ruentis fluctibus Ævi.
Rident imbelles digitos, viresque Sororum,
Fila colo non texta suâ; decreta priusquam
Licia prima cito torquerent pollice Parcæ:
Quin et ab hac Fatum ducit sua stamina lanâ
Et Vulcanus ab his finxit sua vincla metallis.
Non ea contingit faciles emergere in ortus,
Deinde pudens caput in primos abscondere fontes:
Sic Epicureus radios mutabat Apollo.
Non ita qui stabili semper fulgore coruscans
Sol nester, nequit Ipse suas extinguere flammæ.
Illis seu Stygiæ voto constringitur undæ,
Quis non nlla valent exolvi secula vinclis.
Lassaret digitos Jovis hos evolvere nodes.
Nec licet has fixas Arctos immergere ponto.
Respuerent Bona mendaces admittere fucos,
Nativæ aut decus eximium deponere formæ;
Nec deforme Malum quâvis mutaverit arte
Æthiopes vultus specie candentis Honesti.
Finge Deum indulgere malis, obducere nubem
Fraudibus, et securâ involvere crimina nocte:
Vera loqui et facere, affectus cohibere ruentes,
Thure pio superos venerari, mente parentes,
Turpe sit et Nemesis mereatur verbera justæ.
Ergo, perire Deos, tenebras diffundere Solem,
Et lapides sapere, et Sophiam stultescere fingis:
Ergo, nives fidis lambant incendia flammis,
Expers sit rationis Homo, sævam Agna Leænam
Induat, et Libycos populetur fervida saltus;
Facta, volente Deo, fiant infecta, fuisse
Cesset Præteritum, Clotho sua fila retexat,
Distet idem sibi sed coeant contraria in unum.

Scilicet Ideas Recti, a discrimine tutas,
Arce suâ Divina tegit sapientia mentis.

DANTUR SUBSTANTIÆ INCORPOREÆ, NATURA
SUA IMMORTALES.

Esse sacræ Cœleste genus spectabile menti,
Perenne, et expers corporis,
Ore nec ambiguo pronunciat augur Apollo,
Pronunciando comprobat,
Quum flammis Pythiam præsgo arcana furore
Vis æstuantem corripit,
Interioris et ex adytis emurmurat Orbis
Insaniens facundia.
Hoc Dodonææ quoties sonuere columbæ,
Lybumque cornutus Pater?
Emicuit quoties veri hæc scintilla, profundi
Cavernulis Trophonii?
Quin et ei tristes umbræ squalentis Averni
Radios suos accommodant:
Thessalici precibus quæ flectitur auris agyrtæ,
Quis commovetur ritibus?
Quæ freta vis celata quatit, concussa que sistit?
Abigitque ventos, et vocat?
Machina quæ reduces sua in ostia retrahit amnes,
Ripis suis mirantibus?
Cur vetulâ mandante, fugacia nubila parent?
Tremulique montes audiunt?
Quis Magus ex Epheso Romani fata Tyranni
Oculis videbat? an suis?
Quid vatium inspirat cœlesti pectora flatu,
Laxata claustris corporis;
Cœcum ut Dirçæi senis illustraret ocellum
Lumen futuri præscium?
Talibus arguitur siguis abscondita virtus,
Tenebræque verum illuminant.
Quo mihi cœlestes oculos, quibus altera mundi
Excelsioris conspicer
Regna, per immensos lucem sorbentia tractus
Sereaitatis limpidæ;
Si diffusa Animi Regio, liberrima tetris
Fœtentis Hyles sordibus,

Seu Libycæ tellus deserts jaceret eremi,
Referta nullis incolis?
Ex cœco corpus tam multa tuebitur antro,
Animusque cernet nil sui?
Sin et magnifici prætoria Regis Cœli,
Nullos habent satellites,
Stipat Achæmenii fulgentia Suss Tyranni
Augustior frequentia,
Sæpius ad justos quæsitæ muneris usus
Deerunt ministri Cœlites:
Num rotet immanes gyris constantibus Orbes
Immunis æther spiritûs?
Quis Palleneæ celebret sollennia palmæ?
Hymnosque cygneos canat?
Quis Deus affulget? quis divitis ille recludit
Sinus stupendos gloriæ?
Quis pellucenti Divinum pectore lumen
Admittat, et reverberet?
Quis pia vota hominum fidis attolleret ails,
Idem reportans præmia?
Insidiis quis Fortunæ tutctur iniquæ
Urbes, viros, Provincias?
Usque perutile, tam sanctum genus, orbis Origo
Quid obstitit ne conderet?
Non potuit? minus est puras accendere flammæ,
Similes parenti proprio,
Cogere quam crassos terrenâ e fæce vapores,
Tam dispares pulchro patri.
Noluit! impertire suos Divina nitores
Non invidet Benignitas.
Victus eat vacuo senior Gargettius horto,
Suicida sævo dogmate;
Angelicas certo produnt existere formas
Ratio, Fides, Oracula.

Ergo datur Species, sincerior æthere puro,
Tenuique vento rarior,
Fœda venenosæ quæ vincula respuit Hyles,
Mortis malignos fomites.

Resp. D^{re} CUDWORTH, Aul. Clar. Præfect.

Jun. 30. 1651. In Vesperis Comitiorum.